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The Tax Justice Network (TJN) brings together charities, non-governmental organisations, trade unions, social 
movements, churches and individuals with common interest in working for international tax co-operation and 
against tax avoidance, tax evasion and tax competition. What we share is our commitment to reducing poverty and 
inequality and enhancing the well being of the least well off around the world. 
In an era of globalisation, TJN is committed to a socially just, democratic and progressive system of taxation. TJN 
campaigns from a national and internationalist perspective for a tax system which is favourable for poor people, 
which inances public goods and taxes public bads such as pollution whilst tackling unacceptable inequality. More 
information in our objectives can be found on our web site (www.taxjustice.net). Our network originally grew out 
of the world social forum process and the international Attac movement. It is now represented in many countries 
on all continents except Antarctica. 
TJN is a pluralistic, diversiied, non-governmental, non-partisan and multilingual network comprising expertise 
in a wide variety of disciplines and professional spheres with local, regional and national civil society and social 
movements. The network includes tax justice campaigners, researchers, journalists, development specialists, trade 
unionists, concerned business people, tax professionals, politicians and public servants. Many of our members and 
supporters work through national based organisations which share our common name or through other NGOs 
that have adopted the cause of tax justice and the relief of poverty as a key part of their own work.
TJN’s objective is to promote change through public debate and education. We think that public understanding of 
tax matters is the precondition for tax justice. As a result TJN makes information available through mass media, 
conferences and seminars, the internet, newsletters, publications in print and through advocacy. What characterises 
our work is a commitment to expertise and sound research.
TJN research network is spread far and wide in many countries and our campaigning partners can be found 
throughout the world. A list of organisations working on tax justice issues can be found on our website  
www.taxjustice.net. If you are interested in working on these issues or want to know what is happening in your 
country these organisations are your best point of local contact, but if in doubt please contact the research team 
and we’ll do what we can to help. 
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Foreword to the  
second edItIon
TJN has also moved on. Some of the ideas we 
have put to governments in the face of this crisis 
already existed in 2005. The idea of Country-
by-country reporting, for example, was created 
in 2002 when TJN was conceived. Other policy 
proposals have been developed since 2005. Our 
research into inancial secrecy and the volumes 
of personal savings held in offshore accounts has 
stimulated public interest across the world.
Our research tells a compelling story about why 
poverty persists in a world of plenty. We know 
that tax losses to poorer countries exceed the 
amount they receive in aid annually. We also know 
that up to US$3 trillion a year may be lost to 
tax evasion worldwide, with more than 25 per 
cent of these losses occurring in the European 
Union. In an era of austerity budgets, tax dodging 
by wealthy people and powerful companies 
means hardship and loss of hope for hundreds of 
millions of people, especially young unemployed 
people who face lives of high debt, low wages and 
minimal welfare support.
For all these reasons, the issues on which we 
campaigned in 2005 remain just as important, 
probably more so, today. We hope this revised 
and updated version of tax us if you can will 
explain what we do and why and how you might 
get involved in our work to tackle poverty and 
inequality. 
John Christensen, 
Richard Murphy
“More than simple conduits for tax avoidance and evasion, tax 
havens actually belong to the broad world of inance, to the 
business of managing the monetary resources of individuals, 
organisations and countries. They have become among the most 
powerful instruments of globalisation, one of the principal causes 
of global inancial instability, and one of the large political issues 
of our times.”
Recommended 
reading: 
The irst edition of tax us if you can was 
published in September 2005. TJN was then in its 
infancy and this was our irst major publication. 
It has served us well over the intervening period, 
but the time has come for a second edition. 
For those interested in tax justice the past 
seven years have seen enormous change. The 
global economy was booming in 2005. Now it 
is in either recession or depression in many 
countries. The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 
has dramatically changed the tax justice agenda. 
In 2005 it was possible to ignore tax justice 
issues because there appeared to be enough tax 
revenue to go round in most countries: many 
of the problems we address could be ignored 
by politicians, or at least be papered over by 
throwing cash at the problem. This is no longer 
the case: tax revenues are amongst the scarcest 
commodity in most countries. It is that shortage 
of tax revenue, and not excessive state spending, 
which has plunged public inances around the 
world into deicits.
Against this background it is no surprise that 
interest in the connected subjects of tax havens, 
tax avoidance, tax evasion and how to collect 
the trillions of dollars of tax that goes missing 
each year is now so high up the political agenda. 
This increased public awareness demands a 
second edition of tax us if you can.
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The associated problems of collapsing tax 
revenues, capital light, tax avoidance and 
evasion and tax competition have emerged as 
major issues on the global economic agenda.  
As public concern about the widening divide 
between the rich and poor escalates, both within 
and between countries, and the international 
community comes under increasing pressure 
to eradicate poverty, not least in the face of 
deepening crises in many countries, global civil 
society is paying far greater attention to the rising 
share of global wealth held in tax havens – or 
secrecy jurisdictions as we prefer to call them 
(we use both terms more or less synonymously 
throughout this brieing paper) – beyond the 
reach of national tax authorities and the tax 
dodging that accompanies this phenomenon.  
In the space of a decade millions of people have 
come to realise that secrecy jurisdictions, and 
the culture of tax abuse they promote, are part 
of a much deeper problem facing the globalised 
economy.  It is now widely understood that 
as a result of technological change and capital 
market liberalisation that allows the free low 
of money around the world, rich individuals 
and multinational corporations (MNCs) can 
move their money to wherever they wish. Many 
have relocated their wealth and their proits 
to offshore secrecy jurisdictions that offer 
minimal or zero tax rates.  This has created 
enormous problems because, in a world of 
tax havens and globalised markets, tax regimes 
remain largely based on national laws and whilst 
attempts to crack open secrecy jurisdictions by 
international cooperation have made some slight 
improvements it is important not to overstate 
the progress made in tackling this issue: much 
of that progress is supericial, having been 
undermined by intense lobbying from  
powerful vested interests seeking to protect  
the status quo. 
The scale of capital light to the offshore 
economy is immense.  In July 2012 TJN published 
research indings showing that not less than 
US$21 trillion hidden by the world’s wealthiest 
people in the world’s tax havens. The igure may 
be as high as US$32 trillion and, importantly, 
this estimate does not include the vast amount 
of wealth held in the form of real estate, 
superyachts, works of art and even racehorses 
that is “owned” by secretive offshore companies, 
trusts and foundations. 
We should of course offer an immediate word 
of caution: these igures are estimates and we 
have always erred on the side of caution when 
publishing estimates. We also publish all our 
workings. And since we based the estimate on 
four different methods of calculation no one can 
accuse us of not being rigorous. 
A large proportion of this wealth is managed 
from approximately 70 tax havens in order 
to either minimise tax or avoid paying tax 
altogether.  If the income from this wealth was 
charged to tax in the countries where those 
rich individuals were resident or derived their 
wealth, the additional tax revenue available to 
fund public services and investment around the 
world would range between US$190-280 billion 
annually.   Importantly, this estimate of revenue 
loss does not include tax losses due to avoidance 
of inheritance or wealth taxes, taxes on capital 
gains or stamp duties on real estate sales. Nor 
do these estimates include tax avoidance by 
transnational corporations or the lowering of 
revenue income caused by tax competition.
To put our estimate of tax revenue losses from 
personal wealth held offshore into perspective, 
the UN Millennium Project report stated that a 
tripling of the global aid budget to US$195 billion 
a year by 2015 would be enough to halve world 
IntroductIon
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the culture of tax abuse they promote, are part of a much deeper 
problem facing the globalised economy
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poverty within a decade and prevent millions 
of unnecessary deaths in poorer countries. 
In absolute cash terms the cost has probably 
increased a little since this estimate was made 
but the point is clear: eliminating tax haven 
abuse could provide the resources to relieve 
half of the world’s acute poverty. 
Until the turn of the millennium international 
initiatives to tackle the problems posed by 
offshore inance and secrecy jurisdictions, the 
majority of which are directly or indirectly 
connected to inancial centres in OECD 
countries, have paid insuficient attention to 
the position of developing countries.  This 
situation changed in June 2000 when a major 
development NGO published a report drawing 
attention to the harmful impact of tax havens 
on developing countries and identifying why 
their negative impacts are felt most forcefully 
in the global South. Since then signiicant work 
has been undertaken on this issue, much of it 
at well-respected academic institutions. It is 
now fairly widely agreed that tax havens impact 
upon developing countries in four major ways.
First, secret bank accounts and offshore trusts 
encourage wealthy individuals and companies 
to escape paying the taxes they owe.  Studies 
of offshore wealth holdings have shown that 
rich individuals in developing countries hold 
a far larger proportion of their wealth in 
offshore secrecy jurisdictions than their North 
American and European counterparts.  For 
example, over one quarter of African and 
Middle Eastern wealth is believed to be held 
offshore, which is well above the European 
average. This is a trend almost certainly 
encouraged by the widespread growth in 
internet usage which makes the management 
of such accounts far easier while also making 
them harder to detect.  
Second, the ability of transnational 
corporations to structure their trade and 
investment lows through paper subsidiaries 
in tax havens provides them with a signiicant 
tax advantage over their nationally based 
competitors. Trends in international taxation 
over the last decade have made this much 
easier since limitations in the use of what are 
called “controlled foreign companies rules”, 
especially in Europe, have allowed much 
more money to low offshore. In practice 
this biased tax treatment favours the large 
business over the small one, the international 
business over the national one, and the 
long-established business over the start-up. 
It follows, simply because most businesses 
in the developing world are smaller and 
newer than those in the developed world and 
typically more domestically focussed, that this 
inbuilt bias in the tax system generally favours 
multinational businesses from the North over 
their domestic competitors in the developing 
countries.
Third, banking secrecy and trust services 
provided by global inancial institutions 
operating offshore provide a secure cover 
for laundering the proceeds of political 
corruption, fraud, embezzlement, illicit arms 
trading, and the global drug trade.  The lack of 
transparency in international inancial markets 
contributes to the spread of globalised crime, 
terrorism, bribery of under-paid oficials 
by western businesses, and the plunder of 
resources by business and political elites. 
Corruption harms development processes, 
and tax havens provide the facilities that 
support money laundering of the proceeds of 
corruption and all types of illicit commercial 
transactions. There is little evidence that 
initiatives to tackle these issues over the last 
15 years succeeded in curtailing this activity. 
Fourth, the offshore economy has 
contributed to the rising incidence of 
inancial market instability that can destroy 
livelihoods across the world. Offshore 
If countries are to beneit from globalisation, governments must regain the capacity 
to tax their citizens as well as businesses operating within their borders, and to use 
the revenues to inance infrastructure, essential public services and necessary wealth 
redistribution. 
Economic Policy Institute (2004) Rethinking Growth Strategies EPI Books
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inancial centres (OFCs) are used as conduits 
for rapid transfers of portfolio capital in to 
and out of national economies that can have 
a highly destabilising effect on inancial market 
operations. Many developing countries are 
required to hold large hard currency reserves to 
protect their economies from inancial instability. 
These reserve holdings are an expense that 
few countries can afford but, in the absence of 
international agreement on other more effective 
measures to reduce market volatility, they have 
little choice. 
Faced with the pressures of the globalisation 
of capital movements and loudly voiced threats 
that companies will relocate unless given 
concessions on ‘light-touch’ regulation and 
lower taxes, governments around the world 
have responded by engaging in tax competition 
to attract and retain investment capital. Some 
states with limited economic options have 
made tax competition a central part of their 
development strategy. This inevitably undermines 
the growth prospects of other countries, as they 
attract investments away from them, and has 
stimulated a race to the bottom.   The role of 
tax competition as a sustainable development 
strategy is considered further in section1of this 
report, but a recent empirically based study in 
the United States has found:
There is little evidence that state and local tax 
cuts – when paid for by reducing public services 
– stimulate economic activity or create jobs. There 
is evidence, however, that increases in taxes, when 
used to expand the quantity and quality of public 
services, can promote economic development and 
employment growth. 
If this conclusion applies even to a relatively high 
tax economy like the United States, it is doubly 
applicable to economies in south Asia and 
sub-Saharan Africa, where social and economic 
development is held back by under-investment in 
infrastructure, education and health services.  
Proponents of tax competition have never 
answered the crucial question of how far it 
should be allowed to go before it compromises 
the functioning of a viable and equitable 
tax regime.  Taken to its logical extreme, 
unregulated tax competition will inevitably 
lead to a race to the bottom, meaning that 
governments will be forced to cut tax rates on 
corporate proits to zero and subsidise those 
companies choosing to invest in their countries.  
This already happens in some countries.  
The implications of this for tax regimes and 
democratic forms of government around the 
world are dire. Indeed, this is one of the biggest 
threats to freedom the world may now face. 
The problems that capital light, tax avoidance 
and tax competition pose for poorer countries 
have been exacerbated by what appears to 
have been a failure on the part of multilateral 
institutions to protect the tax regimes of 
developing countries when promoting trade 
liberalisation policies.  Political pressure from 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) to liberalise 
trade regimes caused a dwindling of revenues 
from trade taxes on imports and exports.  
Poorer countries have also been severely 
affected by weak international rules relating to 
taxing multinational companies, which enable 
the latter to avoid tax by shifting their proits 
to tax haven-based subsidiaries. Faced with 
dramatic falls in their tax incomes, governments 
have responded by raising VAT rates and 
generally shifting the tax burden onto poorer 
and middle income households.  The process 
has accelerated since 2008, with disturbing 
implications for inequality and social stability.
The problems outlined above were also 
discussed in the report of the United Nations 
International Conference on Financing for 
Development which called on developing 
countries to mobilise resources, especially 
domestic resources, for development. 
The Monterrey Consensus included a call for:
• Strengthening international tax 
cooperation… and greater coordination of 
the work between the multilateral bodies 
involved and relevant regional organisations, 
giving special attention to the needs of 
developing countries and countries with 
economies in transition. 
• Strengthening international tax cooperation 
is a crucial part of remedying the current 
imbalance between globalised businesses 
and nationally based tax regimes.  This 
does not require common tax rates, but it 
does need agreement on a set of universal 
ground rules that will enable countries to 
reduce the scope for tax avoidance and 
illicit activities.  If developing countries are 
to beneit from globalisation, governments 
must regain their capacity to tax citizens 
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and businesses operating within their 
borders, and to use the revenues to inance 
infrastructure, public services and necessary 
wealth redistribution.  
In their joint report on Developing the 
International Dialogue on Taxation, the IMF, OECD 
and World Bank have referred to providing 
technical assistance to improve the effectiveness 
of tax administrations in developing countries.   
What their report did not make clear, however, 
is how developing countries can effectively 
tackle the far more pressing issue of how to 
prevent capital light to tax havens, the majority 
of which are closely linked both politically and 
economically to OECD countries.  
Recent initiatives to abolish banking secrecy 
in tax matters, whether de jure or de facto 
in the case of offshore companies and trusts, 
or to implement a global framework for 
automatic information exchange of relevant tax 
information have not been carried forward with 
the necessary level of political determination, 
and are being actively blocked by countries like 
the UK, which in 2012 signed an agreement with 
Switzerland which permits the latter to retain 
its banking secrecy laws.The absence of a global 
policy framework for discouraging capital light 
and aggressive tax avoidance by TNCs has left 
nationally based tax regimes loundering.  
 The legions of tax planners who operate 
through secrecy jurisdictions are able to run 
circles around tax oficials who are constantly 
hampered by the lack of transparency and 
cooperation from the inancial services industry.   
Lawyers, accountants and bankers abuse their 
professional status to facilitate harmful and 
anti-social behaviour purely for the sake of the 
high fees that they can earn from working in the 
tax avoidance industry.  Their attitude towards 
democracy and society in general was perfectly 
summed-up by a British accountant who told the 
press: “No matter what legislation is in place, the 
accountants and lawyers will ind a way around 
it.  Rules are rules, but rules are meant to be 
broken.” This attitude is unacceptable in any 
context, but is particularly inexcusable when the 
victims of this predatory culture are the poorest 
and most vulnerable people on the planet. 
The aim of this brieing paper is to help readers 
understand the issues underlying the global 
campaign for tax justice.  The paper begins, 
in section one, by exploring the meaning of 
tax justice before moving on to examine why 
tax justice matters – particularly for poorer 
countries. Section two sets out the key systemic 
causes of tax injustice, and section three builds 
on this discussion by looking at the key players 
in the tax avoidance industry. The roles of the 
principal agencies that are trying to tackle global 
tax injustice are discussed in section four, and a 
range of options that TJN proposes to address 
these problems are outlined in section ive. 
Finally, a glossary of terms is included to help 
with understanding the language of tax.
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Tax justice means different things to different 
people.
Some people think it means paying little or no 
tax. Others think it means that each person 
should pay the same tax, either in absolute 
amount, or more likely, at the same ixed 
percentage rate whatever their income. And 
some people think it means that taxes should 
only be paid on a limited range of things, such 
as income from employment or consumption 
expenditure, whilst other sources of income, 
such as that from savings and investments, 
should be untaxed. None of these options offer 
a system that most people would regard as 
socially just or fair. Nonetheless, this diversity of 
views demonstrates the need to be clear about: 
• what a tax is;
• what tax justice is;
• what duties these create in combination 
for governments, individuals, corporations 
and other tax payers. 
1.1 What is a tax?
A tax is any payment made to a government for 
which no direct beneit is provided in exchange. 
For example, a payment to government required 
by law based on a percentage of income earned 
from an employment is a tax. Conversely, the 
payment of a licence fee to a government, for 
example, to enable a person to use a car on the 
highway, is not a tax: it is a service charge. There 
may be justice or injustice in such charges, but 
this is not what we are addressing here. 
1.2 What is tax for?
It is important when people are asked to pay 
their taxes that they know what tax is for. We 
suggest that there are ive reasons for paying 
tax. They are that tax:
• Raises revenue;
• Reprices goods and services that are 
incorrectly priced by the market such as 
tobacco, alcohol, carbon emissions, etc.;
• Redistributes income and wealth;
• Raises representation by encouraging 
participation in the democratic process; 
• Calibrates the economy through iscal 
policy.
1.3 Is tax necessary?
In theory taxes aren’t necessary in any 
economy. Any government could, if it wished, 
simply print its own money to buy the goods 
and services it desires without ever taxing 
anyone. The reality is that the track record of 
printing money without economic constraint 
is not good because hyperinlation can result; 
taxes are needed to make sure the right 
balance between state and private spending 
is achieved by broadly matching tax revenues 
with a government’s spending plans.
There are two other reasons to tax. The 
irst is to achieve the social objectives noted 
above. The other, often unnoticed, reason is 
that taxes are essential to give credibility to 
a government’s currency. If tax has to be paid 
using that currency then there is no choice 
but to use it for most other money-based 
transactions. This underpins a government’s 
control of the economy
1.4 The concept of tax justice
Tax justice, like an elephant, is hard to deine 
though you recognise it when you see it. 
Tax justice is built on the basis of mutual 
obligations from:
• the taxpayer to the state;
• the state to the taxpayer;
• states to each other.
The taxpayer
For taxpayers, tax justice means they accept 
their duty to the states in which they trade 
or reside to declare all their income and 
other transactions fairly and openly and to 
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pay all taxes owed as deined by the spirit of the 
law of that country or countries. This means that:
• they never evade their taxes; 
• they do not seek to avoid their taxes;
• they seek to comply with the spirit of the 
tax laws of all the states that applies to 
them so that they pay the right amount of 
tax in the right place at the right time. 
The state 
Tax justice is a game with two players. It’s not 
enough for the taxpayer to play their part: the 
state to which taxes are paid has a duty to 
create a tax system that:
• Requires each person (whether a real 
person or a corporate entity or trust) to 
pay tax according to their means;
• Imposes no undue cost on them to comply 
with that law;
• Provides them with reasonable certainty as 
to what is due;
• Limits the opportunities for tax avoidance 
that otherwise provides some taxpayers 
with discretion about how much tax is paid;
• Is as clear and concise as possible;
• Provides a system of access to information 
and arbitration when the law is not clear;
• Imposes a duty to ensure that taxes are 
applied impartially, meaning that:
° 
administration of tax has to be and be 
seen to be free of corruption;
°  
collection of tax is enforced, within the 
spirit of the law;
°  
taxes received are openly and 
transparently accounted for;
•  Ensures state expenses are budgeted and 
accounted for through democratic and 
transparent processes.
In addition a state has to avoid the following:
•  Regressive tax systems that charge people 
on lower incomes to a higher proportional 
rate of tax than those on higher incomes;
•  Oppressive tax systems that charge a source 
of income to tax more than once;
•  Inconsistent tax systems that charge 
similar types of income in different ways 
or at substantially different rates. Examples 
include taxing identical income at different 
rates when received by individuals or the 
corporations they own;
•  Incomplete tax systems that are either 
not comprehensive in their scope or allow 
income to fall through loopholes. Both 
encourage tax avoidance and non-compliant 
tax behaviour. 
The international dimension
Tax justice has an international dimension: states 
must cooperate to ensure the following are 
avoided: 
Competing tax systems. Nation states 
are not in competition with each other in 
the same way that irms compete for clients. 
Competition can only exist in that way when 
consumers (in this case entire populations) can 
choose between competing suppliers. Trying to 
apply the microeconomic theory of the irm to 
nation states is therefore false in theory and 
dangerous in practice; in microeconomic theory, 
if a company fails it will be replaced by another 
company. That is not true when nation states fail; 
then the international community must intervene 
to prevent social and economic meltdown. 
What this suggests is that the notion of tax 
competition is based on political ideology rather 
than economic theory, and it promotes economic 
injustice. In practice it favours the interests of 
the tiny number of people who own the majority 
of the world’s businesses. Far from promoting 
the eficient allocation of the inancial capital, tax 
competition encourages mobile capital to scour 
the world in search of tax breaks and subsidies, 
which negates the entire basis of globalisation 
theory. As a result tax competition invariably 
results in social harm and has to be curtailed. 
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States offering their sovereign space 
for hire to the citizens and legal entities of 
other states for the purpose of enabling the 
latter to avoid their obligations to the state 
in which they either reside or trade. This is 
effectively the service provided by secrecy 
jurisdictions to their clients. Acting in this way 
undermines the right of other governments to 
exercise their own sovereign will and as such is 
tantamount to economic warfare.
This report seeks to explore ways in which 
taxpayers and states can act in accordance with 
these principles of tax justice. 
1.5 What is a just tax? 
 
A just tax is: 
• Part of a system of taxes that meets the 
overall objective of tax justice. This means 
a variety of taxes are required. Taxes are 
applied to populations made up of different 
people with a wide variety of incomes, 
values, consumption preferences and savings 
choices. In such real world circumstances 
governments should not rely on just one 
or even one or two taxes to meet all or 
most of their tax objectives. In practice, 
however good a tax is it cannot be judged 
in isolation. 
• Comprehensive on the source of revenue 
that it is supposed to charge. Income taxes 
that allow some income to be untaxed, 
sales taxes that ignore some sales, and tax 
systems that ignore gains from the sale of 
capital assets all provide opportunities for 
abuse because they are not comprehensive. 
Importantly, however, comprehensiveness 
must also take into account exemptions 
and reliefs in support of a government’s 
social policy. 
• Progressive when viewed as part of the 
whole system of taxes. This means that 
overall, taking all taxes into account and 
having regard to those who are likely to 
pay, taxes must start at low overall rates 
and with low absolute amounts due from 
those on low income and both the absolute 
amount of tax due and the absolute 
percentage rate at which it is paid increase 
with the income a person has or can 
command, including incomes arising from 
ownership of companies, and from trusts 
and foundations. 
• Not signiicantly different in rate from other 
taxes on the nearest equivalent form of 
income charged by the same state. Charging 
substantially different rates of tax on earned 
and unearned income, or on corporations 
and individuals will inevitably provide 
opportunities for tax avoidance.
This means that taxes have to be planned as part 
of a system (which includes welfare beneits) 
and not in isolation, and they must cover the 
broad scope of economic activity. In tax terms 
this means a just tax system has to have what is 
called a ’broad tax base‘. 
1.6 Why tax justice matters
Tax justice matters because a modern economy 
requires that the state has suficient revenue 
over time to fund the physical and social 
infrastructure essential to economic welfare. 
It should also enable a degree of wealth 
redistribution between rich and poor people to 
promote equity and security. Failure to achieve 
the irst objective because of poorly designed, 
unfair or leaking tax systems is likely to yield 
economic failure, while failure to achieve the 
second objective will lead to social failure. In 
either case the costs to society are enormous. 
Tax justice is, therefore, at the heart of stable 
and democratic forms of government. 
Box 1 provides a startling indication of the scale 
of global wealth that escapes taxation and the 
losses, in terms of tax revenue, that are involved. 
This indicates just how far we are from achieving 
tax justice at present. 
Taxes have to be planned as 
part of a system which includes 
welfare beneits and not in 
isolation, and they have to cover 
the broad scope of economic 
activity. In tax terms this means 
a just tax system has to have 
what is called a ‘broad tax base.’
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Recommended 
reading: 
“Africa is actually a net creditor to the rest of the world. Of the money 
borrowed by African governments, more than half departs in the same 
year, with a signiicant portion of it winding up in private accounts 
at the very banks that provide the loans. Meanwhile, debt-servicing 
means less money for public health and other needs.”
Box 1: The value of wealth held offshore
At least $21 trillion and possibly as much 
as $32 trillion of hidden inancial assets is 
held offshore by high net worth individuals 
(HNWIs), according to TJN’s report The Price 
of Offshore Revisited, which is thought to be 
the most detailed and rigorous study ever made 
of inancial assets held in offshore inancial 
centres and secrecy structures.  We consider 
these numbers to be conservative. This is only 
inancial wealth and excludes a welter of real 
estate, yachts and other non-inancial assets 
owned via offshore structures.
The research commissioned by TJN from 
former McKinsey & Co Chief Economist James 
Henry draws on data from the World Bank, 
the IMF, the United Nations, central banks, the 
Bank for International Settlements, and national 
treasuries, and triangulates his results against 
data relecting demand for reserve currency 
and gold, and data on offshore private banking 
studies by consulting irms and others.
Other main indings of this wide-ranging 
research include:
• that at the end of 2010 the Top 50 private 
banks alone collectively managed more 
than $12.1 trillion in cross-border invested 
assets for private clients, including their 
trusts and foundations. This is up from $5.4 
trillion in 2005, representing an average 
annual growth rate of more than 16%. 
• the number of the global super-rich who 
have amassed a $21 trillion offshore 
fortune is fewer than 10 million people. 
Of these, less than 100,000 people 
worldwide own $9.8 trillion of wealth 
held offshore.
If this unreported $21-32 trillion, 
conservatively estimated, earned a modest 
rate of return of just 3%, and that income was 
taxed at just 30%, this would have generated 
income tax revenues of between $190-280 bn 
– roughly twice the amount OECD countries 
spend on all overseas development assistance 
around the world. Inheritance, capital gains 
and other taxes would boost this igure 
considerably.
• For our sample frame of 139 mostly low-
middle income countries, traditional data 
shows aggregate external debts of $4.1 tn 
at the end of 2010. But take their foreign 
reserves and unrecorded offshore private 
wealth into account, and the picture 
reverses: they had aggregate net debts of 
minus US$10.1-13.1 tn. In other words, 
these countries are big net creditors, 
not debtors. Unfortunately, their assets 
are held by a few wealthy individuals, 
while their debts are shouldered by 
their ordinary people through their 
governments. 
1.7 Tax justice and inequalities  
of income
Global tax systems have become increasingly 
regressive over the past thirty years. This is 
largely due to a policy shift away from taxing 
business towards taxes on consumption and 
labour, such as VAT and payroll and income 
taxes. Much of the blame for this increase in the 
number of regressive taxes can be fairly laid at 
the door of the IMF and World Bank, both of 
which have required governments to drop tariffs 
on imports and to substitute taxes like VAT on 
consumption in their place. In many cases these 
substitute taxes have not raised as much as the 
taxes they have replaced. This has resulted in less 
spending on education, health and other crucial 
services, which in turn has led to increased 
unemployment. 
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These changes have been regressive because 
business proits and capital income are 
largely paid to richer people, whereas poorer 
households spend proportionately far more of 
their disposable income on consumption and 
have been paying more of their income in tax as 
a result. The poorest households in the world 
are, of course, in poorer countries where this 
trend towards regressive taxation has been most 
marked. This trend towards more regressive tax 
systems partly explains why income and wealth 
inequality has increased in so many regions of 
the world. That same trend has also forced more 
people to borrow to make ends meet: this has 
worsened the debt crisis which has caused severe 
social and economic disruption since 2008. 
This shift towards regressive taxation has been 
accompanied by a signiicant increase in the 
use of secrecy jurisdictions by wealthy people 
and corporations seeking to dodge their tax 
obligations. This is illustrated by the case of the 
British Channel Island of Jersey, a major secrecy 
jurisdiction closely linked to the City of London.
In combination, more regressive taxes being 
charged on most households coupled with 
lower top rates of tax on income and corporate 
proits, and greater use of tax havens for dodging 
taxes due, has resulted in a signiicant shift in 
the distribution of the tax burden, with a large 
number of super-rich people being able to simply 
avoid paying tax or being given preferential 
treatment. 
The subjects of every state ought to contribute 
toward the support of government, as nearly as 
possible, in proportion to their respective abilities; 
that is, in proportion to the revenue which they 
respectively enjoy under the protection of the state.  
Adam Smith
Jersey is a major tax haven. As this graph shows, with 
igures also adjusted for inlation, the volume of offshore 
deposits it held rose enormously from 1980 onwards 
as the capital market liberalisation introduced by Prime 
Minister Thatcher in the UK and President Reagan in 
the USA and which spread throughout the world saw 
tax havens lourish. Only the 2008 global inancial crisis 
slowed the growth. 
Source: Jersey Finance.
The tax rate on the proits of corporations has been 
falling steadily since 1997. The following graph is based 
on tax rate data for nearly 70 countries. They have been 
split for presentational purposes between those with 
populations of more than 15 million (large countries) and 
those with smaller populations (small countries). What 
is clear is that in both cases the trend in corporate tax 
rates has been heavily downward. Companies are paying 
less tax as a result. Evidence since 2010 suggests the 
trend is continuing. 
Source: KPMG.
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Tax havens are justiied by their proponents 
on the grounds that they offer a legitimate way 
for people and companies to avoid unfair tax 
burdens and regulation. This assumes, however, 
that all citizens and companies are equally 
mobile, which is not the case, and also ignores 
the free-rider problem. In practice tax havens 
simply help those who are already wealthy to 
shelter at least part of their income and wealth 
from taxes that might be due. The result is that 
such places deliberately and knowingly promote 
inequality and injustice. 
Promoting equity through the 
tax system
• Justice requires that people be treated alike 
if their circumstances are similar. Unhappily, 
many tax systems around the world 
encourage differential treatment of people 
who should be treated alike. Examples 
include:
• Not all income is subject to tax. If people 
on similar income derive it in different ways 
and some income is taxed and some (for 
example, from capital gains) is either not 
taxed, or is taxed at lower rates, then they 
will have different tax bills;
• Different tax structures are taxed in 
different ways e.g. in some countries self-
employed income received through private 
corporations is taxed more favourably than 
that received directly by an equivalent self-
employed taxpayer;
• Unclear law allows different tax deductions 
to different people. If the law is badly 
drafted or poorly administered it may 
be possible for some people to claim 
deductions against their income that others 
cannot secure;
• Corruption is a fact of life in many parts 
of the world. Some people may resort to 
bribing tax oficials when others do not;
• Advantages are given to foreigners. Many 
tax systems provide beneits to people 
temporarily resident in a country that are 
not available to those born in it. This is 
the case in the UK, where the so-called 
“domicile rule” discriminates between 
people on the basis of their national origin;
• Those with different consumption patterns pay signiicantly differing amounts of sales 
tax. Most especially, those who are well off 
and who can save automatically pay less as a 
proportion of their income in consumption 
taxes than do those who have to spend all 
their income to make ends meet. 
• Issues such as these can be a serious cause of political tension and conlict. 
The gender implications of tax 
justice
Tax injustices impact on individual welfare across 
the world, but especially on poor and lower 
income households, many of which are headed by 
women. Inequality of tax treatment matters to 
such households in particular because:
• poorer households must to be able to 
survive on their after-tax income;
• income is unfairly distributed around the 
world; 2.5 billion people lived on less than 
US$2 a day in 2008, the latest year for which 
data is available;
• the distribution of tax as well as the 
distribution of income has an impact on 
household welfare;
• some taxes, especially those on 
consumption, can have a greater impact on 
welfare than others.
These issues are of particular importance to 
women. Women typically earn less than men, but 
the bulk of the responsibility for childcare falls on 
women in most societies and, in many cases, the 
inancial burden of bringing up children also falls 
on mothers. This means women are especially 
vulnerable to a variety of unjust tax measures:
Sales and consumption taxes are particularly 
penal on women and children who often suffer 
the lowest levels of income in society. This 
happens because sales taxes are charged on 
everyone, regardless of whether their household 
income falls below the threshold at which income 
tax becomes payable.
The shift towards greater use of sales taxes 
has arisen in response to increased tax 
competition. Because multinational businesses 
can exploit opportunities for tax competition 
Women and children almost always suffer irst 
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• pay signiicantly differing amounts of sales 
tax. Most especially, those who are well off 
• of political tension and conlict. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
inancial burden of bringing up children also falls 
Women and children almost always suffer irst 
when there are cuts in government spending. 
which consumers and normal citizens cannot, 
corporation tax rates have been falling steadily 
and the shortfall in government income is often 
made up by increasing sales taxes or by cutting 
state expenditure. 
Women and children almost always suffer most 
from cuts in government spending. Both require 
more healthcare services than men, and children 
need education, which is expensive.
Beneit systems are often badly designed and 
poorly integrated within the tax system resulting 
in many women and children being effectively 
trapped into patterns of poverty. This occurs even 
in wealthy countries because the effective rates of 
tax they suffer as they start to work are punitive 
due to the combination of tax being charged and 
beneits being withdrawn. 
The insidious impact of tax 
competition
Many business lobbies urge countries to compete 
with one another to attract inward investment by 
offering:
• lower tax rates on proits;
• tax holidays;
• accelerated tax allowances for spending on 
capital assets
• subsidies;
• relaxation of regulations;
• the absence of withholding taxes;
• other forms of tax inducement
This process, called tax competition, has been 
widely adopted across the world and has become 
a key element in shaping world-wide investment 
lows. The IMF, World Bank and EU have all, in 
varying ways, encouraged developing countries 
to compete in this way for inwards investment. 
Tax competition is, however, fundamentally lawed 
as a development strategy because it limits the 
control any country can have over taxation 
policies and creates harmful distortions.
Nations do not compete with each other for the 
loyalty of their citizens. Nor do they compete 
in the provision of services. The vast majority 
of people must use the services of the state in 
which they live and the concept of introducing 
‘competition’ between states makes no sense in 
terms of promoting meaningful choice for users 
of public services. Instead, by creating downward 
pressure on tax rates, tax competition reduces 
the capacity of states to inance public services 
effectively and in an equitable way.
In addition, tax competition does not, contrary 
to the argument of those who support it, 
exert competitive pressure on governments 
to be more ‘eficient’. Governments are not 
proit-maximisers in the economic sense of 
that term and do not collude with one another 
to raise tax levels in the way that businesses 
frequently collude to raise price levels. In a 
democratic system governments are accountable 
to their electorate, who are highly conscious 
of tax levels and must be allowed to decide 
between high tax / high spend and low tax / 
low spend governments. Seeking to create an 
artiicial ‘competition’ between different states 
undermines the ability of electorates to choose 
between these options and is fundamentally anti-
democratic. 
Distorting the international 
trading system
In addition to being fundamentally anti-
democratic, tax competition is also harmful 
to the functioning of global trade in two ways. 
First, tax competition distorts investment lows 
by diverting investment to territories where, in 
many cases, it is used ineficiently. That ineficiency 
is only compensated by the tax subsidies the 
investment attracts. The only winners in such a 
process are the mobile businesses that can play 
one government off against another in order to 
secure tax advantages and subsidies. This is why 
the rise of tax competition has been so closely 
related to the growth of globalised business, and 
in turn to the increase in global wealth inequality 
that has been intimately related to the process of 
globalisation. 
Large, old, international companies obtain many tax 
advantages that small, new and nationally based 
companies do not, which undermines any possibility 
of there being a level playing ield in trade taxation. 
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Second, poor taxation systems can affect the 
international trading regime because: 
• Most tax systems are biased towards larger 
companies that can:
❍ set up offshore companies without 
question in cases where individuals or 
small companies cannot.
❍ afford complex legal advice to make it 
appear they acted in accordance with the 
law.
• Most tax systems are biased towards older 
companies that have frequently been set 
up using structures that are now illegal, but 
which remain unchanged since the time 
they were created. This often allows them 
to operate offshore when new companies 
cannot.
• Tax systems are biased towards 
multinational companies:
❍ MNCs ind it much easier to abuse 
transfer-pricing rules since these require 
at least two countries to be involved.
❍ MNCs are more able to lower 
their tax rates using licensing and 
royalty arrangements for intellectual 
property, the use of thin capitalisation 
arrangements to provide intra-group 
funding from tax haven based internally 
owned treasury functions (effectively the 
MNC’s own internally owned bank) and 
through hedging and derivative trading 
operations.
❍ MNCs can exploit tax arbitrage 
techniques.
Very often all three characteristics combine so 
that large, old, international companies obtain 
tax advantages that small, new and nationally 
based companies do not, which undermines 
any possibility of there being a level playing ield 
in trade as a result of distortions inherent in 
taxation systems. As a result start-up businesses 
are placed at a disadvantage and additionally 
suffer higher tax compliance costs in proportion 
to their trade. 
This tax distortion is to be found around the 
world in countries large and small, developed 
and developing, tax haven or not. Since the global 
economy is driven as much by small businesses 
as large ones, tax injustice is clearly a signiicant 
impediment to businesses around the world 
as well as to a more just international trading 
system. 
Small investors are 
disadvantaged
Ordinary stock market investors, not all of 
whom are wealthy, can also be prejudiced by 
current taxation practices. A signiicant part of 
the wealth invested in stock exchanges around 
the world is controlled by pension funds and 
life assurance companies. Many of those who 
save through such institutions are on relatively 
modest incomes. 
Tax justice concerns arise for many ordinary 
people because their savings are being invested 
in companies that are not transparent about 
the taxation risks they face. Recent research in 
the UK shows that at least 80% of the largest 
UK based companies do not pay tax at the 
rates expected of them. This situation is worse 
in the USA, where Citizens for Tax Justice and 
the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy 
analysed 280 of America’s most proitable 
companies and found that 78 of them paid no 
federal income tax in the period 2008-2010. It’s 
worth mentioning that the 280 companies also 
received a total of US$223 billion in tax breaks. 
In fact, the report unearthed 30 companies 
that enjoyed a negative income tax rate over 
the three year period, while reporting proits 
totalling US$160 billion. 
These companies suggest they exploit tax breaks 
to deliver shareholder value. In reality they do 
so to artiicially lift the share price. If that share 
In combination, tax competition, aggressive tax avoidance, tax evasion and the associated 
illicit capital light to offshore inance centres imposes a massive cost on developing 
countries. This cost exceeds aid lows by a considerable order of magnitude and also 
distorts investment patterns to the extent that it undermines growth in developing countries 
whilst also stimulating asset market bubbles in developed and developing countries. 
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price ever fell because these tax breaks were 
closed it is the saver and not the company 
directors who would lose as a consequence. 
That is why the claim that tax is just another 
cost to these companies that must be minimised 
on shareholders’ behalf is wrong on a number of 
counts:
• First, shareholders beneit from tax paid 
by corporations. That tax provides health, 
education, welfare, the maintenance of 
peace and stability and other beneits 
on which communities depend. While 
brokers, analysts and company directors 
might argue for tax minimisation this does 
not necessarily relect the views of the 
real shareholders, who are seldom if ever 
consulted on this matter.
• Second, because corporations have to 
make very little disclosure about the taxes 
they pay in most countries there is no 
way of knowing whether the tax liability 
they declare to be due is sustainable 
or not. If the igure is not sustainable a 
current under-declaration will lead to an 
overvaluation of shares because companies 
tend to be valued on post-tax earnings. 
If companies are overvalued those with 
long-term savings, such as people saving for 
retirement, will eventually lose out.
• Third, the possibility for inlating share 
prices by reducing tax charges encourages 
senior management to aggressively avoid 
tax because their share options are 
triggered by increases in the stock value. 
This puts their interests in direct conlict 
with those of shareholders seeking long-
term rates of return on their investment. 
This led to many of the problems of 
corporate abuse of the tax system seen 
in the US, in particular in the late 1990s, 
which imposed a heavy price on many 
shareholders in the subsequent collapse of 
the stock market. This pattern recurred in 
2008. 
• Fourth, investors might want to invest 
in companies that are managed on an 
ethical basis. Many aggressive tax avoidance 
practices would be considered ethically 
unacceptable, but without greater 
disclosure investors do not know which 
companies are engaging in such practices.
Sustainable development 
depends on tax justice
Tax policy is an essential element of the 
sustainable development agenda and tax 
injustice represents an important obstacle to 
poverty reduction.
Tax competition imposes direct costs on 
governments, and the biggest losers are 
amongst the poorest countries. TJN-Africa 
and Action Aid International have estimated 
that just four East African countries, Kenya, 
Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda, lose tax revenues 
amounting to US$2.8 billion a year from 
unnecessary tax exemptions and incentives 
provided to foreign companies.In many cases 
governments are forced to provide these 
unnecessary tax breaks, either because the 
companies concerned use their political 
bargaining power to play one country off against 
another, or because governments are told to 
offer reduced rates by the IMF or World Bank 
as a condition of obtaining inancial support. 
Guided by its ideological fervour, the World 
Bank even lists lowering tax rates as one of 
its guidelines for identifying “business-friendly” 
countries.
Much of the money lost to poorer countries 
as a result of the actions of multinational 
corporations is moved to tax havens. The 
sums noted are, of course, estimates, but 
real examples like the Vodafone case in India 
illustrate the problem. By routing the sale of an 
Indian telephone network through the Cayman 
Islands, Vodafone shifted some $2.9 billion of tax 
away from India. The Indian government is still 
trying to collect this sum. 
How to test tax justice? 
It is important to have simple tests available 
that will help assess the tax justice of an action. 
Two such tests are needed. 
The test for a taxpayer is that they should 
The outcome of these failures has been the creation 
of the gaps, spaces and loopholes in which abuse 
occurs. The entire tax avoidance industry is based 
on exploiting these gaps, spaces and loopholes. 
Sustainable development is not possible without 
their removal. 
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ask this question: If any reasonable person, 
newspaper or government knew what I am 
doing, is it likely that they would either:
• consider it illegal, or 
• consider it legal, but might want to change 
the law to prevent others acting in the 
same way in the future. 
If either of these are true then clearly the action 
is not consistent with tax justice.
The test for anyone in government considering 
their taxation system is also in two parts: is our 
tax law just to all those who might have to pay it, 
taking all its components into consideration?
• if another government behaved as we do 
would we consider their actions a threat 
to the welfare of our state or its taxation 
revenues? 
If there are doubts in either case then action is 
needed to remedy the defects. 
Conclusions
Unjust tax practices incur costs that fall most 
heavily on poor people. They also threaten 
the fabric of our society and undermine the 
commercial trust that is the basis of modern 
economies. 
Unjust tax practices do not happen by accident. 
While the majority of people suffer as a result 
of tax injustices, a small minority beneit 
enormously from them. It is to these people that 
we now turn our attention and ask fundamental 
questions such as:
• Who creates unjust taxation practices?
• What exactly do these practices consist of?
• Who now promotes unjust taxation 
practices?
• What can be done about them?
Recommended 
reading: 
“The ownership of Third World wealth onshore and offshore is now 
even more concentrated than it was before the debt crisis in the 
1980s and the privatisation wave of the 1990s.  Depending on the 
country, the top one percent of households now accounts for seventy-
ive to ninety percent of all inancial wealth and real estate.”
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2. causes oF  tax InJustIce
Tax injustice is widespread and occurs on 
a massive scale. But tax injustices happen 
for speciic reasons, all of which arise from 
human interventions. So who are the people 
that beneit from tax injustice and how have 
they shaped tax policies to obtain their goals? 
Before we consider this question we need to 
identify in broad terms the reasons why tax 
injustices occur.
The most common roots of tax injustice are:
• the failure to promote comprehensive tax 
systems;
• the promotion of regressive taxes;
• the failure to charge all income to tax;
• failures of tax administration;
• the promotion of tax havens to hide 
income from tax and to shelter criminal 
practices;
• the existence of professions willing to 
undermine the tax system.
The outcome of these failures has been the 
creation of the gaps, spaces and loopholes in 
which abuses occur. The entire tax avoidance 
industry is based on exploiting these gaps, 
spaces and loopholes. Sustainable development 
is not possible without their removal. 
2.1 Onshore is important
The most obvious thing to say about this list 
is that more of it relates to what happens 
within states than what happens offshore 
or in the international arena. Tax justice is 
both a domestic and an international issue. 
The two are related, but it is important to 
remember that most people never leave their 
country of birth, never have income arising 
outside that country and never engage with 
the international tax system, but that does 
not mean they don’t suffer from tax injustice. 
Therefore, for the vast majority of people, tax 
is a domestic issue determined by their place 
of birth, but so too in that case is tax justice. 
2.2 Comprehensive taxation 
systems are crucial
Tax is the ultimate political battleground. 
Conlicting interests need to be resolved 
equitably if justice is to be achieved. It is 
important that no government is allowed to 
prolong systems of tax injustice on the entirely 
false basis that “there is no alterative”. There are 
always alternatives in tax. 
Any government seeking to pursue the cause of 
tax justice would promote the following taxes: 
• An income tax, probably split between 
federal (or national) and local levels and 
charged on income from:
❍	 employment;
❍	 self-employment in any form of trade;
❍	 investment income from savings, 
dividends and speculation of all sorts;
❍	 rents, royalties and licence fees;
❍	 proits not taxed by other taxes;
• A corporation tax on company proits 
unless they were charged to income tax;
• A inancial transaction tax designed 
primarily to curtail socially useless high 
volume, low margin trading;
• Property taxes, preferably based on the 
taxable value of the land;
• A capital gains tax on the increase in the 
value of assets over time, paid on their sale;
• An inheritance or gift tax on the disposal of 
assets by gift during lifetime or on death;
• A wealth tax; 
• A sales tax (although with speciic 
exemptions for essential items such as food, 
housing, heat and light, education, health, 
and basic clothing, at least for children).
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• Environmental taxes, including taxes on 
waste and carbon usage.
• Withholding taxes on income paid abroad.
Payroll taxes may discourage employment, but in 
many cases they also raise substantial revenue. 
If it is necessary to ensure overall tax rates are 
kept at a reasonable level, then a payroll tax 
may be added to the list. For our purposes we 
do not consider the withholding of income tax 
from wages to be a payroll tax. Such taxes have 
a variety of names, most commonly including 
national insurance and social security. 
Such a wide variety of taxes does not 
necessarily make for a simple tax system, and 
the situation is further complicated by the fact 
that any tax system must be integrated with the 
welfare beneits system for the relief of poverty 
and care for the disabled and unemployed. This 
integration is essential to ensure penal taxes 
are not imposed when beneits are withdrawn 
as earnings increase. There are, however, 
good reasons why such comprehensiveness is 
essential:
• with a broad range of taxes no single tax is 
excessively important in the income of the 
government. That means each tax can be 
charged at a reasonable level, thus reducing 
the incentive to avoid or evade it;
• with a comprehensive range of taxes 
charged at broadly compatible rates if 
one tax is avoided there is a reasonable 
probability that another tax will catch that 
income instead. For example, if income 
which a taxpayer seeks to reclassify as a 
capital gain is caught by a capital gains tax 
at a largely similar rate then whole exercise 
of avoiding the income tax becomes a 
waste of time. In the absence of a capital 
gains tax the temptation to wrongly 
describe income in an attempt to avoid tax 
increases substantially;
• different taxes address varying sections 
of the taxpaying population, and in 
combination achieve an equitable and 
progressive spread of taxation across 
society as a whole; 
• some taxes are included less for their 
contribution to revenues (this is probably 
true of most capital gains and gift and 
inheritance taxes) but more because the 
opportunity for avoidance is much higher 
without them and because the information 
they provide helps to ascertain whether 
other tax liabilities are being fairly assessed.
Comprehensiveness is also required in the design 
of the taxes. In principle the base for each tax 
should be as broad as possible, meaning that the 
tax applies to as wide a range of transactions as 
possible, is not limited in scope, and is subject 
to as few exemptions and incentive deductions 
as possible. A major objective must be the 
prevention of unnecessary loopholes, subject 
always to the need for those allowances needed 
for the implementation of social policy.
2.3 Regressive taxes should be 
avoided
All comprehensive tax systems will include some 
regressive taxes. Sales and carbon taxes, for 
example, may well be regressive in their impact 
on poorer households, but, if they form part of 
a comprehensive system of taxes and beneits, 
regressive outcomes can be mitigated through 
other parts of the iscal system. 
Arguments put forward in favour of having just 
one or two ‘simple’ (typically ‘lat rate’) taxes 
must be treated with suspicion. Almost invariably 
such taxes are promoted either by the wealthy 
or by those who act on their behalf. Research 
has shown that a ‘lat rate’ tax system is likely to 
result in a considerable overall shift of the tax 
burden on to households with lower incomes.
2.4 The challenges posed by 
international income
Even when a country has established fair taxation 
within its boundaries there remains a signiicant 
risk that the resulting system could be unjust 
because it may not charge international income 
to tax appropriately. This problem might arise for 
two reasons:
• irst, the tax system may fail to charge to tax 
income arising within its territory but which 
belongs to people resident elsewhere, or;
• second, it may fail to charge to tax income 
belonging to people who are resident in 
its territory when that income is earned 
elsewhere.
Make everything as simple as possible, but not 
simpler.  Albert Einstein 
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Both these failings are commonplace, and both 
give rise to tax injustice. It is contrary to the 
principle of fairness that people should be treated 
differently when they have similar sources of 
income because:
• they live in different places that happen to 
be divided by an international border even 
though the income they enjoy is earned in 
the same place, or;
• they can shift the source of their income 
outside the country in which they live but 
it is otherwise similar in all respects to an 
income that would have been taxed within 
that country if it had arisen within it.
For this reason countries have to adopt rules 
to tackle these issues. No single rule can tackle 
this problem comprehensively: just as a range of 
taxes are needed to ensure tax is fair, so a range 
of rules are needed to ensure different sorts of 
income are taxed fairly when international issues 
are taken into account. 
Around the world business lobbies argue for 
simpliication of the tax codes, suggesting that 
all that is needed for tax injustices to be solved 
are simpler rules. Sadly, this is not realistic: in 
a complex, globalised world tax systems have 
to relect the complexity that business and 
internationally mobile people deliberately create. 
Tax systems also have to explicitly permit the 
complexity that business creates because much 
of it is necessary to permit international trade. 
Einstein famously proposed that we “make 
everything as simple as possible, but not simpler”, 
and this applies to tax policy as much as any other 
policy area: simplicity for the sake of simplicity is 
likely to create more loopholes for multinational 
businesses and wealthy people to exploit, meaning 
that more of the tax burden will fall on ordinary 
people who are not internationally mobile. 
In this case the irst requirement of an 
international tax system is a comprehensive 
way of determining where a person, company, 
partnership, trust or foundation might be resident 
for tax purposes, and if it is resident in more than 
one place. This is not always easy because far too 
many of the rules currently in use were designed 
in the steamship age and are inappropriate for the 
internet era. 
A second requirement, when activities being 
carried out in country A can be managed 
remotely from country B using sophisticated IT 
systems, is to recognise that many of the concepts 
on which international tax is currently based, such 
as physical presence in a place being the factor 
determining whether someone is taxable or not, 
are irrelevant. Once again most tax administrations 
remain stuck in the age of the steamship and 
telegraph.
The result is that if we are to have comprehensive 
tax systems some complexity is needed and some 
principles have to be agreed. To begin with, all 
countries should have the right to charge income, 
gains, sales, gifts and inancial transactions arising in 
their territories to tax there, whoever makes them. 
This is called a source basis for taxation. What it 
means is that even if the person being taxed might 
be resident in another country, the country in which 
the transaction is taking place must have irst right 
to tax the income arising on it. 
Traditionally, and appropriately, source based taxes 
are either levied on sales or by withholding tax 
from payments made out of a territory. The irst is 
essential to ensure a level playing ield with local 
businesses; the second reduces the risk of double 
taxation, while withholding taxes eliminate the risk 
of non-taxation. Source based taxes are an essential 
component of the international taxation armoury. 
Residence based taxation is also vital. Under this 
concept a person or company who is considered to 
be located in a jurisdiction is taxable there. Ideally 
they should be taxed there on their worldwide 
income: a remittance basis where income from 
overseas is only taxed when brought into a person’s 
place of residence simply encourages tax haven 
activity. Territorial bases of tax, which only tax 
income that is actually earned in the place that a 
person or company is resident are even worse: 
such bases merely encourage those with control 
over their income streams (largely the preserve of 
wealthy people and large companies) to relocate 
that income out of the country where they are 
resident. 
Much of the work undertaken on tax havens, and 
a large part of the tax planning industry, involves 
exploiting legal loopholes for tax planning purposes, 
which ultimately involves tens, and maybe hundreds, 
of thousands of trained accountants, lawyers, and 
bankers in an activity that is wholly unproductive 
and anti-social.
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In the real world a country cannot rely on 
just a source or residence basis of taxation. 
A combination of both is needed and the 
remittance and territorial bases of tax should be 
avoided. Even then, a further set of provisions 
may be required to capture those who want to 
exploit any remaining gaps. This might require 
a citizenship basis for individuals and a unitary 
basis for companies, both needing to be used 
when the taxpayer or company has a substantial 
international dimension to their taxation affairs. 
It is only through such a ‘layering’ approach to 
taxation that the problems of tax injustice on 
international income can effectively be tackled. 
2.5 How tax administrations 
might fail to ensure tax justice
Tax administrations can fail at numerous levels:
• tax law is not clearly written meaning what 
is taxed is not clear;
• tax law is not readily available to everyone 
who wants it;
• tax law is not fairly applied;
• there are few or excessively expensive 
means of appeal against decisions made by 
taxation authorities;
• tax is not collected in an even-handed 
manner;
• tax authorities fail to coordinate with 
each other, either within a country or 
internationally to ensure fair taxation is 
applied to a source of income either within, 
or from outside, the country;
• tax administrations do not have the 
resources they need to conduct their work 
properly;
• the burden of tax administration is passed 
to the private sector without clear guidance 
being given, but with penalties being imposed 
for failure to comply with the law. There is 
particular risk of this in the administration of 
payroll taxes, taxes on employed income and 
all forms of sales tax;
• the tax administration is corrupt.
These are serious issues. If a tax system is not 
backed by fair law it cannot yield tax justice. 
While the tax administrations of many countries 
are reasonable, those in other countries are not. 
This is not, it should be stressed, necessarily due 
to corruption: the root cause is often the scarcity 
of skilled and experienced revenue oficials, who 
are all too often poached by the private sector to 
work on ‘the other side’. 
Tax justice requires that tax administrations 
receve the resources they need to fulil the 
tasks required of them. It is not possible to 
have lourishing, corruption-free democracies 
without strong tax administrations. Strengthening 
tax systems and the agencies that deliver them 
must become a high priority, not least among 
the international funding agencies and donor 
countries who, thus far, have paid insuficient 
attention to building sustainable public inances in 
poorer countries. 
2.6 Secrecy jurisdictions are a 
root cause of tax injustice
There is little that has contributed more to 
tax injustice than the promotion of secrecy 
jurisdictions by bankers, lawyers and accountants 
wanting to proit from abusive tax practices. 
Secrecy jurisdictions are, in many senses, ictional 
spaces. Of course there is a physical place 
that bears their name, but secrecy jurisdiction 
operations have a common characteristic: the 
transactions they record do not really take place 
in the secrecy jurisdiction where the accounting 
takes place. Those transactions actually take place 
somewhere else, and it is ‘elsewhere’ that deines 
offshore. ‘Offshore’ does not refer to small islands 
set in wide oceans, it simply means ‘not here’. As 
a result secrecy jurisdictions are primarily used as 
‘booking locations’. All they provide is a place to 
record a transaction whose impact is elsewhere. 
As a result the use of secrecy jurisdictions 
invariably involves a degree of sham or pretence. 
It is not possible to have lourishing, corruption 
free states without strong administrations to 
provide them with the revenues they need to fulil 
the reasonable expectations of their peoples. 
Strengthening tax systems should therefore be a 
high priority. 
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A common factor of all secrecy jurisdictions 
is that a company registered in one need put 
almost no information about its affairs on public 
record and very often it need supply no account 
of its activities to any ofice of the government 
of that jurisdiction. Even if the names and 
addresses of the shareholders and directors 
must be reported, it is almost never required 
that these be on public record, and nominees are 
allowed. A nominee name is a person who is paid 
a small fee to say she is a director of a secrecy 
jurisdiction company when in fact she has no 
real involvement in its operation. 
To add to this air of secrecy and artiiciality, 
many secrecy jurisdiction companies are 
owned by trusts. These trusts are themselves 
set up offshore, typically in a different territory 
from that in which the company they own is 
registered. The trustees of that trust (who will, 
almost certainly, also be nominees) will usually 
be located in a third secrecy jurisdiction. To add 
yet more complexity, the bank account of the 
company or trust may be located in yet another 
secrecy jurisdiction. Within the tax avoidance 
industry it is generally thought that involving 
three or more secrecy jurisdictions in a tax 
evasion structure will make it nigh on impossible 
for outside authorities to investigate what is 
really happening, and who is beneiting from it.
There is a further advantage to the person 
who sets up such an arrangement. Oficially 
the company, trust, and trustees, and bankers 
might each be located in different territories, 
but equally each of them might suggest that 
their activities do not record transactions that 
actually take place in the country in which they 
are located. The outcome is that the activity 
appears to take place nowhere. That is the 
ultimate goal of such arrangements, for the aim 
is to make them accountable to no one, pay 
tax to no one, and to have no duty to report 
anything to anyone because it can deny it is 
anywhere.
The result is that in the secretive, parallel 
universe of secrecy jurisdictions, structures 
can be set up to carry out real functions in the 
real world but without any requirement for a 
transparent legal presence that conirms their 
existence or the nature of their activities. This 
creates the opportunity for all sorts of illicit 
activities by:
• allowing tax evasion to take place largely 
undetected;
• facilitating capital light;
• allowing other crimes such as money laundering, insider trading, drug traficking, 
people traficking and more to take place 
largely undetected.
All these things undermine civilised society. The 
offshore economy of secrecy jurisdictions is a 
massive root cause of social and tax injustice. 
In the secretive, parallel universe of tax havens, structures can be set up to 
carry out real functions in the real world but without any requirement for a 
transparent legal presence to conirm their existence or the nature of their 
activities. This creates the opportunity for all sorts of illicit activities.
“ They say that the ancien regime in France fell in the 18th century 
because the richest country in Europe, which had exempted its nobles 
from taxation, could not pay its debts. France had become . . . a failed 
state. In the modern world the nobles don’t have to change the laws to 
escape their responsibilities: they go offshore.”
Nick Shaxson, Treasure Islands, 2011
Recommended 
reading: 
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3. keY PLaYers In tax InJustIce
role in regulating money laundering and related 
activities in secrecy jurisdictions. Here we 
concentrate on tax issues.
At present those who promote tax injustice 
have the upper hand in this battle because 
globalisation and technological change have made 
it easier for rich individuals and businesses to 
avoid paying taxes. It is for this reason that civil 
society organisations around the world must 
intervene to tackle this issue. By raising the issue 
on the international agenda for the past decade 
civil society aims to generate the political will to 
tackle abusive tax practices.
3.1 The origins of the tax 
avoidance industry
It is important to understand some of  
the historical background to the current 
situation.
The ‘offshore’ phenomenon probably began in 
the US in the late nineteenth century when 
states such as New Jersey and Delaware 
realised they could lure businesses from more 
prosperous states by offering tax advantages 
on condition that they register in their states. 
Incredibly, although this practice began so long 
ago it was and still is similar to many modern tax 
haven practices. 
The irst real international use of tax havens 
probably started in the early twentieth century 
in the British Empire when wealthy people 
started to use offshore trusts established 
in places like the British Channel Islands to 
exploit the curious British phenomenon of the 
separation of taxation residence and domicile. 
This abuse resulted from two causes. The irst 
was the spread of the British Empire, and British 
Don’t be evil: Google Inc. cut its taxes by US$3.1 billion using a technique that moves 
most of its foreign proits through Ireland and the Netherlands to Bermuda.
Google’s income shifting -- involving strategies known to lawyers as the “Double Irish” 
and the “Dutch Sandwich” -- helped reduce its overseas tax rate to 2.4 per cent.
Tax injustice does not happen by chance. 
It typically occurs as a result of careful and 
deliberate planning, especially in the case of 
the tax avoidance industry. Huge resources are 
devoted to this industry because the proitability 
of tax avoidance is far higher than that of most 
other types of inancial services activity.
The following are the main players who promote 
tax injustice:
• accountants;
• lawyers;
• banks;
• multinational companies;
• tax haven governments;
• individual tax dodgers.
The following are trying to tackle the problem:
• the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development;
• the United Nations;
• the European Union;
• the G20;
• national tax authorities;
• civil society.
Other agencies e.g. the International Monetary 
Fund and Financial Action Task Force also have a 
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capital with it. The second cause was the 
increase in tax rates during the World War One.
In the 1920s the UK created new ways for 
internationally mobile capital to avoid tax. This 
was precipitated by a UK court ruling that 
a company incorporated in the UK was not 
subject to UK tax if its board of directors met 
in another country and it undertook all its 
business overseas. At a stroke, the concept of 
the separation of the place of incorporation 
of a company and its obligation to pay tax had 
been created. This concept survived in UK law 
until the 1990s, by which time it had become 
the basis for the operation of most tax haven 
corporations throughout the world.
The idea of splitting the duty to pay tax from 
the concept of taxation residence was next 
severed for individuals in the 1930s, when 
Switzerland began to offer internationally 
mobile people residence in that country and 
only required them to pay a ixed amount of tax 
a year, agreed in advance and not varying with 
income, details of which did not need to be 
disclosed. This concept has been widely copied. 
The other major Swiss contribution to tax 
injustice is banking secrecy, a concept which 
they developed at the time of the French 
Revolution (for the beneit of the French 
aristocracy) but which became enshrined in 
Swiss law in the 1934. The Swiss move was 
not, as popularly claimed, an attempt to help 
German Jews hide their assets from the Nazis 
as this had not become a signiicant issue in 
1934. It was, instead, a response to a French 
tax scandal a year or two earlier when a long 
list of names of prominent French citizens 
using Switzerland to hide their income from 
the French tax authorities was published in 
France. The Swiss responded by passing its 
bank secrecy laws to protect the identity of tax 
evaders outside Swiss borders. 
None of these things happened by chance. They 
were thought up by lawyers and accountants 
and exploited by them and their bankers for 
commercial gain.
3.2 The accountants
Accountants have played the largest part in 
promoting tax injustice. Much of the planning 
that has created the current environment 
of tax injustice took place within the British 
commercial and legal environment in which 
accountants rather than lawyers tend to be 
at the forefront of tax advice. Accountants 
have increasingly organised themselves into 
transnational companies or partnerships, 
largely driven by the need to be able to audit 
their transnational client companies under the 
statutes of most developed countries. 
After many consolidations, mergers and the 
failure of Arthur Andersen, there are now just 
four large irms of accountants in the world. 
They are (in current order of size):
• PricewaterhouseCoopers (PWC)
• Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
• KPMG
• Ernst & Young
These irms have combined annual revenues of 
US$110 billion. Research has shown that each 
operates in more than 130 jurisdictions. They are 
notable for signiicant presence in all the major 
secrecy jurisdictions surveyed by TJN and many 
of the minor ones as well. TJN research has 
shown a marked correlation between secrecy 
and the concentration of the presence of these 
irms in a location. 
Each of these irms is involved in promoting 
secrecy jurisdiction activities. PWC, Ernst & 
Young and most particularly KPMG were heavily 
criticised for promoting the sale in the US of 
what the US Senate Permanent Subcommittee 
on Investigation called ‘tax products’ in 2003. 
That committee found that some of these 
products were almost certainly illegal. They 
also found that KPMG may have made at least 
US$180 million from the sale of some such 
schemes and that collectively the schemes they 
sold had probably cost the US Treasury up 
to US$85 billion in lost revenue. KPMG were 
heavily ined as a result. 
Deloittes and Andersen (a irm it has now 
substantially absorbed) were criticised for the 
work they did for Enron by the US Senate in 
its report on the failure of that company. Enron 
declared proits of US$2.3 billion between 1996 
and 1999 but paid no tax. It employed a network 
of up to 3,500 companies to achieve this aim, 
at least 440 of these being registered in the 
Cayman Islands alone. 
TAX JUSTICE NETWORK24
KPMG was heavily criticised by the US 
Bankruptcy Court for its role in creating 
tax saving schemes which lacked economic 
substance on behalf of WorldCom before it 
failed. These schemes were designed to save it 
billions in tax through what were subsequently 
considered entirely artiicial arrangements 
involving the licensing of what KPMG called 
‘management foresight’. Given the spectacular 
failure of that company it is not hard to see that 
this management foresight had little real worth. 
In addition, the evidence of the inappropriate 
behaviour of these irms does not come from 
the US alone. In 2005 the European Court of 
Justice offered an opinion on a KPMG promoted 
scheme for avoiding the UK’s sales tax, or VAT. 
In their sales promotional literature for the 
scheme KPMG admitted that they knew that 
the UK taxation authorities would consider the 
scheme to be ‘unacceptable tax avoidance’. They 
nonetheless promoted it as a tax product to 
people who were not previously clients of their 
irm. The court opinion concluded that KPMG’s 
tax shelter was an improper attempt to avoid 
VAT. 
Senator Carl Levin (current chairman of the 
U.S. Senate Sub-Committee) summarised the 
phenomenon where secrecy providers create 
complexity to ultimately increase secrecy as 
MEGO “My Eyes Glaze Over”: 
“Abusive tax shelters are usually tough to 
prosecute. Crimes such as terrorism, murder, 
and fraud produce instant recognition of the 
immorality involved. Abusive tax shelters, by 
contrast, are often MEGOs,’ meaning ‘My 
Eyes Glaze Over.’ Those who cook up these 
connections count on their complexity to 
escape scrutiny and public ire”
Deloitte also engages in such activity. In 2004 
it was involved in designing a scheme for the 
London ofice of Deutsche Bank to enable the 
latter to avoid paying payroll tax and national 
insurance contribution worth around £92 
million on employees’ bonuses. The scheme, 
operated through a Cayman Islands registered 
investment vehicle, was ruled unacceptable by a 
UK tax tribunal in January 2011. Judge Williams, 
who presided over the tribunal, found that 
“the Scheme as a whole, and each aspect of 
it, was created and coordinated purely for tax 
avoidance purposes”.
No doubt there are many, many more such 
schemes: they all take several years to surface. 
Of course these irms are not alone in 
promoting a culture of tax avoidance, or in 
suggesting the use of tax havens. But they have a 
particular responsibility to bear for a number of 
reasons:
• Their size means they dominate the 
worldwide accounting profession;
• They are so big that another failure 
amongst them would now effectively mean 
that the worldwide audit market would 
collapse for lack of choice of irms to 
undertake the work. They plead special 
privileges for themselves because of this, 
but appear not to recognise their duty to 
society in return. The concept of ‘too big 
to fail’ applies to these irms as much as it 
does to banks;
• They heavily promote the cause of 
corporate social responsibility, no doubt 
seeing opportunities to proit from CSR, 
but do not appear to recognise the role 
they play in promoting corporate social 
irresponsibility in tax avoidance;
• Although they no doubt avoid dealing 
with the most abusive end of the offshore 
taxation and accounting market, the 
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respectability their presence bestows on 
many of the world’s secrecy jurisdictions 
provides a veneer of legitimacy they do not 
deserve;
• These irms wish to appear to be bastions 
of society, frequently promoting the arts, 
academic chairs, and even institutes of 
ethics, but they take extreme measures 
to evade scrutiny of their own activities. 
For example, KPMG is operated from 
a secretive Swiss base while PWC’s 
international operations are hidden behind 
an obscure company in London that claims 
to have no income but does operate its 
global web site. Although the irms do 
publish accounts, this has been a very 
reluctant move which has only happened in 
the last few years and the data supplied is 
by no means suficient to understand and 
scrutinise commercial operations of their 
size;
• These irms use their privileged positions as 
government advisers to promote their own 
and their client’s special interests. 
Because of this, these irms have a special 
responsibility to:
• abandon their support for tax haven 
practices;
• stop all forms of taxation planning that are 
not tax compliant;
• cease promoting taxation policies that 
increase tax injustice.
They have a further duty. Their members 
dominate the administration of the most of the 
professional institutes of accountants around 
the world. These professional bodies promote 
‘ethical codes of conduct’. TJN research has 
not found a single ethical codes of conduct 
that condemns the use of secrecy jurisdictions 
and tax avoidance by its members. In view of 
their privileged position, the Big 4 irms of 
accountants have a duty to support a change in 
the ethics of the accountancy profession to ban 
these activities. 
3.3 The lawyers
Lawyers have undertaken the following critical 
roles in creating tax injustice:
• they have written the laws that have 
allowed much of it to take place;
• they have sought to enforce those rules; 
• they have created a climate of fear in which 
it is believed that a person must act in tax 
non-compliant ways if -
❍	 they are to act in accordance with the 
law (although that is not true)
❍	 they are to meet shareholders 
expectations (although shareholders are 
not asked if that is true)
❍	 they are not to breach the secrecy rules 
that lawyers have themselves drafted in 
many of the tax haven territories;
• they write the commercial contracts which 
incorporate the use of offshore and other 
steps that seek to use the secrecy space of 
the offshore world;
• they usually create the trust deeds and 
other documents that allow the abuse that 
these types of structure enable;
• they act as nominee directors and 
shareholders, or arrange the services of 
those who do.
As is the case with many accountants, there are 
lawyers who prefer to avoid using the offshore 
and tax haven world. Sadly this is not true of the 
profession as a whole, and many of the larger 
commercial law practices are heavily involved 
in developing abusive offshore structures. This 
particularly applies to members of the self-styled 
‘Offshore Magic Circle’ of law irms who not 
only promote abusive tax structures to their 
clients, but also actively shape the laws and 
Detailed analysis of the world’s top 50 
international private banks reveals that at the 
end of 2010 they collectively managed more than 
US$12.1 trillion of cross-border invested assets on 
behalf of their private clients, including via trusts 
and foundations. Almost of all of these clients will 
have been engaged in ‘tax minimisation.’
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regulatory practices of the secrecy jurisdictions 
they operate from.1
3.4 The banks
The world of offshore inance, and the tax 
abuse that goes with it, is dependent upon the 
presence of mainstream banks in the offshore 
territories. Detailed analysis of the world’s top 
50 international private banks reveals that at 
the end of 2010 they collectively managed more 
than US$12.1 trillion of cross-border invested 
assets on behalf of their private clients, including 
via trusts and foundations. Almost of all of these 
clients will have been engaged in ‘minimising’ 
their taxes.
The banks tend to cluster in havens that are 
geographically located close to the regions in 
which they operate. Thus the Cayman Islands 
attract South American banks, for example, 
whilst Bermuda and the Bahamas have a large 
presence of US banks, the Channel Islands have 
strong British and European representation 
and the Paciic territories see more Australian 
and New Zealand banks. But nowhere does a 
territories’ banking service operate in isolation. 
People bank offshore because they recognise 
and trust the names of the banks to whom they 
give their funds. Without these banks operating 
in this way the offshore world could not exist. 
And without the banking secrecy which all these 
banks support, the administration of the world’s 
tax system would be substantially cheaper 
and more effective. For this reason the leading 
transnational banks, without exception, play a 
major role in the offshore world.
They also play a substantial role in the world 
of aggressive tax avoidance and evasion. In the 
oficial reports in the US that have criticised the 
roles of most of the major irms of accountants 
in supplying abusive tax products many major 
banks were named for knowingly providing the 
funding to facilitate these transactions. Those 
named included Deutsche Bank which knowingly 
inanced tax products produced by KPMG. JP 
Morgan Chase and Citigroup were also criticised 
in various ways for their role in the Enron 
debacle, including providing inance through 
offshore vehicles. 
1  http://www.tackletaxhavens.com/2012/02/offshore-law-
irm-boasts-of-its-conlicts-of-interest/ 
3.5 Multinational companies 
Multinational companies deserve special 
mention amongst those who promote tax 
injustice. Their role can be highlighted for 
several reasons:
• they are, or should be, the largest 
taxpayers: all too often they avoid taxes 
in most countries where they operate;
• they have greater opportunity to abuse 
the world’s tax systems within the letter 
of the law than any other taxpayer;
• when they transgress it is eventually 
very obvious, and imposes costs on a 
great many people.
This gives multinational corporations a 
special responsibility to ensure that they 
pay the taxes they owe in the countries in 
which they make proits. There is however 
overwhelming evidence that this is not what 
they do. Instead in almost every case MNCs 
argue that:
• tax is a cost;
• costs must be minimised;
• their duty to their shareholders requires 
them to do this;
• they must in consequence avoid tax 
wherever possible.
This is a disingenuous argument. First, tax 
is not a cost and accountants demonstrate 
this when they declare a pre-tax proit in 
the proit and loss account and subsequently 
show two distributions from that igure. The 
irst distribution being tax and the second 
being dividends paid to shareholders. The tax 
due on a company’s proits is not described 
as a cost in any accepted accounting standard. 
Like dividends, it is a return to a stakeholder 
out of the surplus made by the company. 
In that case it cannot follow that there is 
an obligation to minimise the tax cost in 
a company because tax is not a cost. This 
statement is consistent with company law 
in most countries in the world. That law 
says, in most cases, that a company must be 
run for the beneit of the shareholders. In 
many cases that obligation is also qualiied 
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by a requirement to take the interests of other 
stakeholders into account. What is certain, 
however, is that company law does not require a 
company to:
• operate outside the spirit of the law;
• take the risk of breaking the law;
• hide what it does from view (including that 
of the shareholders);
• undermine national tax systems and free-
ride of facilities funded by others.
Nor, unfortunately, is there evidence that MNCs 
or their tax advisers have consulted shareholder 
views on this matter. It is fair to assume that 
many shareholders in pension funds, mutual 
funds and structured savings schemes, who own 
– albeit indirectly – the shares in most MNCs, 
would not want a company to minimise its tax 
bill. They most certainly would not want it to do 
so if that involved risk of:
• illegal action, as much tax planning does;
• underpayment to developing countries, as 
much transfer pricing does;
• the creation of artiicially inlated short-term 
share prices which the understatement of 
current tax liabilities usually will;
• higher taxes being paid by all other 
members of the community.
3.6 Secrecy jurisdictions
Secrecy jurisdictions contribute towards creating 
a system which worsens the imbalance of 
wealth distribution in the world, which hinders 
sustainable development. 
Some of microstates involved see no way out 
of the dilemma which they have created for 
themselves. In places like Cayman and Jersey 
more than 50 per cent of the economy is 
dependent upon the inancial services industry. 
If tax haven activities were to stop their 
economies would collapse in the short-term. 
However, these places are small and the cost of 
providing them with economic support during 
a transition to the creation of a more gainful 
economy is miniscule in proportion to the costs 
they impose upon the world economy.
For secrecy jurisdictions such as Austria, 
Luxembourg and Switzerland the problem is 
one of political will. The OECD and European 
Union have tried to take action against some of 
the smaller states which abuse the world tax 
system through the use of harmful tax practices, 
but neither the OECD nor the EU have been 
successful at bringing their own members to 
book when they have undertaken the same 
activities.
There is an urgent need to create consistency 
in the approach towards harmful tax practices 
including low tax rates, the failure to apply 
withholding taxes for non-residents and the 
refusal to exchange tax data between countries. 
All havens, large and small, developed and 
developing, share this responsibility without 
exception, but the richer nations have the 
greater responsibility because they maintain 
their systems at the cost of imposing a direct 
burden upon the poorer people of the world.
3.7 Tax payers
Of course, tax injustices of the type we have 
described above would not occur without 
individuals who want to exploit the system. In 
a just world one might hope that an appeal to 
reason and the common good would discourage 
those who use tax havens and other aggressive 
tax planning practices. In reality, however, where 
an opportunity exists some will exploit it. 
That is why we concentrate the 
recommendations we make later in this report 
upon:
• stopping the supply of these services;
• making it harder to beneit from them;
• ensuring the penalties from seeking to exploit such activities are suficient to 
discourage those considering doing so.
There is an urgent need to create consistency 
in the approach towards harmful tax practices 
including low tax rates, the failure to apply 
withholding taxes for non-residents and the 
refusal to exchange tax data between countries.
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Secrecy jurisdictions assessed with an opacity score exceeding 60 
Source: 2011 Financial Secrecy Index
Box 4. Secrecy Jurisdictions with an opacity score exceeding 60 
(ranked alphabetically) Source: 2011 Financial Secrecy Index
Jurisdiction Secrecy Score
1 Andorra 73
2 Anguilla 79
3 Antigua & Barbuda 82
4 Aruba 74
5 Austria 66
6 Bahamas 83
7 Bahrain 78
8 Barbados 79
9 Belize 90
10 Bermuda 85
11 Botswana 79
12 British Virgin Islands 81
13 Brunei Darussalam 84
14 Cayman Islands 77
15 Cook Islands 75
16 Costa Rica 77
17 Dominica 80
18 Ghana 79
19 Gibraltar 78
20 Grenada 83
21 Guatemala 81
22 Guernsey 65
23 Hong Kong 73
24 Isle of Man 65
25 Japan 64
26 Jersey 78
27 Lebanon 82
Jurisdiction Secrecy Score
28 Liberia 81
29 Liechtenstein 81
30 Luxembourg 68
31 Macao 83
32 Malaysia (Labuan) 77
33 Maldives 92
34 Marshall Islands 90
35 Mauritius 74
36 Monaco 75
37 Montserrat 86
38 Netherlands Antilles 83
39 Panama 77
40 Philippines 73
41 Samoa 85
42 San Marino 79
43 Seychelles 88
44 Singapore 71
45 St Kitts & Nevis 81
46 St Lucia 89
47 St Vincent & Grenadines 78
48 Switzerland 78
49 Turks & Caicos Islands 90
50 United Arab Emirates (Dubai) 79
51 Uruguay 78
52 US Virgin Islands 68
53 Vanuatu 88
Austria, Guernsey, Isle of Man, Japan, Luxembourg, 
US Virgin Islands
61–70
71–80
81–90
91–100
Andorra, Anguilla, Aruba, Bahrain, Barbados, Botswana, Cayman, 
Cook Islands, Dominica, Dubai, Ghana, Gibraltar, Hong Kong,  
Jersey, Labuan, Mauritius, Monaco, Panama, Philippines, San Marino,  
Singapore, St Vincent and Grenadines, Switzerland, Uruguay
Antigua & Baruda, Bahamas, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin Islands, Brunei 
Darassalam, Grenada, Guatemala, Lebanon, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Macao, 
Marshall Islands, Montserrat, Netherland Antilles, Samoa, Seychelles, St Kitts 
& Nevis, St Lucia, Turks & Caicos Islands, Vanuatu
Exceptionally secretive: Maldives 
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The problem of tax injustice is rising on the 
agendas of many organisations and civil society 
groups. The principle agencies tackling tax 
injustice are:
4.1 The OECD
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) issued its report 
called Harmful Tax Competition in 1998. It 
deined the factors to be used in identifying 
these harmful tax practices, many of which it 
associated with tax havens and made wide-
ranging recommendations to curtail such 
practices. In doing so the OECD added its voice 
to that of the Financial Action Task Force, which 
has been criticising tax havens for their role in 
money laundering since 1989. 
Since the early 2000s the OECD has largely 
concentrated on promoting the Global Forum 
on Transparency and Exchange of Information 
for Tax Purposes. This forum is tasked with 
trying to promote cooperation and information 
exchange, but its critics – not least TJN – 
argue that it has devoted too much energy 
to promoting weak bilateral tax information 
exchange agreements (TIEAs), much favoured by 
the forum’s secrecy jurisdiction members, rather 
than multilateral information exchange based on 
automatic exchange of tax information.
From 2001 until 2009 the OECD attempts to 
tackle tax havens were seriously hampered 
by the pro-tax haven approach of the 
administration of US President George W 
Bush. The election of President Obama as the 
2008 inancial crisis erupted changed the US 
approach to this issue and in April 2009 at the 
G20 London Summit the OECD was asked to 
spearhead a new campaign against tax haven 
abuse.
Unfortunately its chosen instrument for this 
policy was the TIEA. The structure of the TIEA 
had been negotiated with tax havens during the 
very darkest period of the OECD’s tax haven 
campaign when it looked as if any progress on 
the issue would be blocked by the USA. Not 
surprisingly, they have proven weak, cumbersome 
and ineffective as a deterrent to tax evasion.
TIEAs incorporate fundamental laws in their 
design. The irst law is that the information 
exchange is not automatic: the state needing 
information has to request it. The second law 
is the considerable dificulty put in the way of 
making that request. A request for information 
under a TIEA must provide or state: 
(a)  the identity of the person under 
examination or investigation; 
(b)  what information is sought; 
(c)  the tax purpose for which it is sought; 
(d)  the grounds for believing that the 
information requested is held within the 
jurisdiction to which request is made; 
(e)  to the extent known, the name and address 
of any person believed to be in possession 
of the requested information. 
The number of successful TIEA requests remains 
low: Jersey has admitted that since 2005 when 
it became engaged in this process it has still to 
exchange more than 100 pieces of information. 
The reason for the low number of information 
requests lies with the dificulties imposed on 
requesting countries. There is considerable 
secrecy within tax havens. This is either created 
by law e.g. through legal banking secrecy, or 
through the combination of legal entities and 
professional services designed to ensure that 
the activities of those availing themselves of 
those facilities are opaque. As a consequence 
it is, for example, nigh on impossible to link 
bank accounts operated by a company in turn 
controlled by a trust with a particular taxpayer 
in another jurisdiction who may or may not be 
settler and / or beneiciary of that arrangement. 
In reality TIEAs have little or no practical value 
because the ‘smoking gun’ required to trigger 
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the information request either does not exist 
or cannot be created to the standard required 
by courts in the secrecy jurisdictions. Not 
surprisingly, the concept of TIEAs based on the 
‘by request’ model is widely regarded as a failure.
The situation was made worse when the OECD 
decreed in 2009 that a secrecy jurisdiction could 
achieve what it described as internationally 
acceptable levels of transparency by signing just 
twelve TIEAs even though there are around 200 
tax administrations in the world. In many cases 
secrecy jurisdictions met this target by signing 
agreements with microstates like the Faroe 
Islands and Greenland, or with one another, 
reducing the OECD’s unambitious programme 
to the level of farce.
Since 2009 the OECD has tried to enforce an 
inspection regime to ensure compliance with 
standard double tax agreements (principally 
between major states) and TIEAs (mainly with 
tax havens). However, seeking to enforce a 
fundamentally lawed system is not the same as 
taking effective measures in the irst place.
Worse, under pressure from some parts of the 
business community the OECD has rejected 
the concept of Country-by-Country reporting 
since it (rightly) sees this concept as being linked 
to the issue of unitary taxation, to which it is 
vehemently opposed. This is because the OECD 
remains committed to the arm’s length method 
of transfer pricing allocation of proits between 
states. This is despite the widely recognised 
problems that arise when trying to apply the 
arm’s length method in practice.
Until the OECD acts to substantially change 
its approaches to tax havens, information 
exchange and proit allocation in multinational 
corporations, it will remain an obstacle in the 
path of tax justice. 
4.2 The European Union
The European Union (EU) also identiied 
problems of harmful tax practices within its 
borders during the 1990s. It made little sense 
for the EU to promote a single market between 
its members if they were competing with each 
other on tax.
The EU took two steps in the late 1990s to 
tackle tax abuse. First, it demanded that its 
member states put an end to what it calls 
preferential tax regimes. This has curtailed some 
of the more esoteric tax structures offered 
by various EU member states, especially in 
Ireland and the Benelux countries. Unusually 
this step, under what is called the EU Code of 
Conduct on Business Taxation, also extended 
to the dependent territories of EU member 
states, including the British Channel Islands and 
dependencies of the Netherlands. 
Under EU pressure, Guernsey, the Isle of Man 
and Jersey, were required to offer the same tax 
rates to companies owned by their citizens as 
those offered to companies owned by non-
residents. The attempts of all these jurisdictions 
to comply with the Code of Conduct have been 
long drawn out and complex, largely because of 
TJN’s resolute efforts to expose their failures 
to comply. Compliance has had dramatic impact 
on the tax systems of all three islands, all of 
which have experienced budget crises of varying 
signiicance. Importantly, and in stark contrast 
to the OECD, the EU has demonstrated that 
effective external pressure can be brought to 
bear on tax havens. 
The second initiative the EU promoted was 
the European Union Savings Tax Directive. 
This promoted the automatic exchange of 
information between member states on bank 
and other deposit holdings held in other 
member states. Again, this initiative faced 
considerable political dificulty, partly because 
this it applies beyond the EU to the dependent 
territories of the UK and the Netherlands, 
and also extends to non-EU countries such as 
Switzerland and Liechtenstein. 
Unfortunately, to secure the introduction of the 
scheme in 2005 some compromises had to be 
made meaning that some EU countries (initially 
Belgium, Luxembourg and Austria, but now 
just the last two) refusing to participate in full. 
As a result they, Switzerland and Liechtenstein 
plus some (but not all) of the UK’s dependent 
territories opted for a two-track scheme. 
Under this arrangement a person with an 
account in those places but who was resident in 
another EU country could opt out of automatic 
information exchange with their domestic 
tax authority and opt in to a withholding tax 
provision. Initially this withholding was set at 
a rate of 15%; now it is at 35%. A number of 
jurisdictions, like the Isle of Man and Guernsey 
subsequently opted in to automatic information 
exchange, but Austria, Jersey, Luxembourg and 
Switzerland persist in refusing to cooperate. 
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The current state of the European Savings Tax 
Directive is far from ideal. The withholding tax 
option undermines the system of automatic 
information exchange, but more importantly 
the Directive only applies to accounts held 
by individuals. It does not relate to funds held 
in trusts and companies, which is how most 
offshore assets are held. Since 2008 the EU has 
been working to extend the scope of the system 
and much technical progress has been made 
towards closing the current gaps and loopholes. 
Since creating these two measures the EU 
has also made progress on three other fronts 
relating to tax justice. The irst relates to 
adoption of a Financial Transaction Tax. At time 
of writing this measure has the support of at 
least twelve EU member states and consent to 
apply the FTT in those countries is imminent. 
EU countries linked to tax haven activities, such 
as Ireland and the UK, oppose this move which 
represents a key component in a just tax system. 
Secondly, the EU Parliament supports country-
by-country reporting, the merits of which are 
noted elsewhere in this report. A version of 
country-by-country reporting for the extractive 
industries is likely to become EU law in 2013.
Thirdly, the EU has been promoting unitary 
taxation in the form of the EU Common 
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base. The EU’s work 
on this vital measure is pioneering and reinforces 
its role as a leading promoter of tax justice. 
4.3 The United Nations
The role of the United Nations (UN) in taxation 
is not widely known. Its irst contribution has 
been to encourage nations to agree double 
tax treaties to ensure the smooth running of 
international taxation. The League of Nations 
began this process in the 1920s. The UN 
published a model double tax treaty although 
this has largely been supplanted by the OECD 
model treaty, on which most double tax treaties 
are now based.
The UN’s second role is as host of a little known 
committee called the Committee of Experts on 
International Cooperation in Tax Matters. First 
formed in 1967 as an ad hoc group of experts, 
the Committee was upgraded to Committee 
status in 2004, in accordance with the wishes 
of the then UN Secretary General Koi Annan. 
Many countries would like this Committee to be 
enhanced to an inter-governmental political body, 
but OECD countries persist in blocking efforts 
to achieve this upgrade. Unlike the OECD, 
which is a rich countries’ think tank, the UN Tax 
Committee is fully open to all countries, and 
therefore can fairly claim a legitimate mandate to 
represent the interests of poorer countries. The 
potential exists for this Committee to gradually 
expand its remit to perform the functions of a 
World Tax Authority (discussed in section 5).
4.4 Governments
Some governments promote tax haven activities. 
Others expend great efforts in challenging 
them. Strangely, some do both; for example the 
British Crown dependency of Jersey introduced 
draconian anti-avoidance tax measures in 2005 
to stop its own citizens taking advantage of tax 
haven services that Jersey offers to citizens of 
other countries.
This suggests how we might assess whether 
or not a country is promoting tax justice or 
condoning unjust tax practises. If it is consistent 
in its approach, making it hard for anyone to 
participate in harmful tax practices while seeking 
to provide a fair tax system for its own citizens 
and businesses operating within its territory 
then it is on the right path. 
For the past three decades the trend has 
been towards increasing tax injustice in most 
countries. Happily there are signs that this 
trend might be ending. Facing budget crises, 
and mounting pressure from civil society, 
governments are starting to:
• introduce general anti-avoidance provisions 
in taxation law;
• apply stiffer penalties to tax avoidance and 
evasion;
• restrict the scope for accountants, lawyers 
and others to sell tax planning schemes 
without disclosing what they are doing to 
taxation authorities;
The European Union Savings Tax Directive has 
established the principle of automatic information 
exchange between nations and is therefore a 
welcome step towards a global framework for 
automatic information exchange. 
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• strengthen international cooperation to 
tackle tax abuses, both at a multilateral and 
bilateral levels;
• take effective action to tackle tax haven 
abuse. 
Regrettably, however, many countries, and 
international organisations, remain committed 
to policies which result in tax injustice, such as 
tax competition. The US and UK, for example, 
are committed to tax competition, as is the 
OECD. This means that their parallel attacks on 
harmful tax practices are intellectually lawed. All 
governments need to have a consistent approach 
to these matters so that their commitment to 
tax justice is unambiguous. Around the world 
civil society needs to draw attention to these 
lawed polices and the harm they cause. 
4.5 Civil society
Civil society is increasingly engaging with the 
issues of capital light, tax avoidance, tax evasion 
and tax competition, which are widely seen 
as impediments to sustainable public inances 
and equality. In June 2000 Oxfam, one of the 
major development NGOs, published a report 
entitled Tax Havens: Releasing the hidden billions 
for poverty eradication. The creation of TJN was 
partly a consequence of the publication of that 
report. In the US Citizens for Tax Justice has been 
undertaking a not dissimilar job, though with a 
national focus. TJN was purposefully created with 
an international focus.
When TJN was formally launched in March 
2003 it was unique in its focus on campaigning 
on international tax policy. The extent to which 
this subject had previously been neglected was 
evident later that year. When the G8 countries 
held their summit meeting in Evian in June 2003 
over 300,000 people demonstrated in nearby 
Geneva, and 3,000 NGOs registered to lobby 
the delegates: Geneva literally ground to a halt. 
When the UN Committee of Tax Experts met in 
Geneva four months later, TJN was the only civil 
society organisation to attend and address the 
meeting. 
Things have improved remarkably since then. 
TJN is now active on six continents. We have 
lourishing networks in Africa, Australia, Europe, 
Central, South and North America, and several 
Asian countries. Within ten years tax justice has 
become irmly established on the political agenda.
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Much can be done to tackle tax injustices at both 
the national and international levels. All  
that is required is the political will to go ahead. 
The role of civil society campaigners is to create 
the environment in which that political will exists. 
TJN can fairly claim to have made signiicant 
progress towards that goal since we published 
the irst edition of tax us if you can in 2005. This 
is largely because we have adopted a solutions 
focussed approach to our campaigning: we have 
not just described problems when undertaking 
our work; we have consistently sought to offer 
solutions as well. We hope this is apparent in the 
suggestions for campaigning that we outline in 
this chapter.
A wide range of issues must be addressed, 
including the following:
• Country-by-country reporting
• Automatic information exchange
• Citizenship and personal taxation
• Corporate taxation
• Country level actions to improve personal 
and corporate taxation
• General anti-avoidance principle
• World Tax Authority (WTA)
• Tax assistance for developing countries
• Holding governments to account
• Publish who you are
• Trusts
• The national agenda
5.1 Country-by-country 
reporting
The campaign for country-by-country reporting 
has become virtually synonymous with TJN; 
indeed, its very existence arises from the very 
irst conversation between the two authors of 
this report. 
Country-by-country reporting is an accounting 
concept. It simply requires multinational 
corporations to include the following 
information in their accounts, without exception:
• a list of all countries and jurisdictions where 
they operate;
• a list of the names of all their principal 
subsidiaries in each country or jurisdictions 
where they operate;
• a proit and loss account for every country 
or jurisdiction where they operate;
• limited balance sheet and cash low data 
largely relating to assets employed and tax 
liabilities and payments made.
Importantly, the proit and loss account would 
have to analyse tax charges between their 
current and deferred tax elements and, vitally, 
they would also be required to split the data 
used to calculate proit before tax between 
trades with third party customers and suppliers 
and intra-group trades.
These issues are important. The aim of country-
by-country reporting is to:
• disclose where multinational corporations 
trade, record their sales, employ their staff, 
declare their proits, declare and pay their 
taxes (or not, as the case may be) and hold 
their assets with the aim of holding them 
to account locally for what they currently 
declare globally; 
• disclose how intra-group trading is 
potentially used as a mechanism for shifting 
proits around the world;
• disclose the information needed to hold 
governments to account for the tax 
revenues they receive from companies, thus 
reducing the risk of corruption;
• enhance governance in multinational 
corporations by making them accountable 
for their use of tax havens. 
Crucially, all companies already have the irst 
two categories of information, though it is 
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notoriously dificult to obtain this information. 
Having it publicly available would be a irst, 
important, step towards making global businesses 
accountable locally.
After a decade of discussion on country-by-
country reporting in accounting and other 
arenas there is near universal agreement that 
the data needed to prepare the accounting 
information demanded by country-by-country 
reporting should also be available (though some 
multinational corporations still deny this!). 
The reason is straightforward: if multinational 
corporations did not have the data to allocate all 
their transactions to speciic jurisdictions they 
would not have the information they needed to 
prepare their tax returns. If that were the case 
they would not be keeping the books and records 
required by company laws across the world. 
Importantly, if country-by-country reporting was 
not readily achievable it would be politically hard 
to demand it since it imposes costs on business. 
As it is, the only signiicant additional costs would 
be those of auditing this data, and that audit cost 
would be more than offset by the reduced risk 
to shareholders resulting from this information 
being available to them.
The campaign for country-by-country reporting 
is a success story. The issue is now on the agenda 
of the International Accounting Standards Board, 
the OECD, the EU, the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in the USA, and other bodies. 
Due to the untiring efforts of the Publish What 
You Pay campaign a form of country-by-country 
reporting is now on the US statute book as 
section 1504 of the Dodds Frank Act and a 
Box 5: A Case Study in Transfer Pricing – SABMiller
In October 2010 Action Aid revealed that the 
world’s second-largest beer company, SABMiller, 
was avoiding millions of pounds of tax in India 
and the African countries where it makes and 
sells beer by routing proits through a web of 
tax-haven subsidiaries.ActionAid estimated 
that SABMiller may have reduced its African 
corporation tax bill by as much as a ifth, depriving 
poorer countries of up to £20m (US$31m) in tax.
The report outlines several ways in which tax is 
avoided, via transfer pricing schemes:
• Dutch detour: The company holds its brands 
in the Netherlands. In one case, it’s brands 
such as Castle, Stone and Chibuku: venerable 
African beers, for sale to Africans in Africa. 
The Ghana subsidiary will pay royalties to 
these subsidiaries, where they pay minimal 
corporation taxes (and the same royalty 
payments can then be deducted against tax 
in Africa.)
• Swiss sidestep: SABMiller’s African and Indian 
subsidiaries pay ‘management service fees’ 
to sister companies in European tax havens, 
mostly Switzerland, where effective tax rates 
are much lower. The head of the Ghana 
Revenue Authority told ActionAid that 
“management fees is an area that we know 
is being used widely [to avoid tax] . . . it’s 
dificult to verify the reasonableness of the 
management fee”.
• Mauritius manoeuvre: A Mauritius subsidiary sees its trading proits taxed 
at 3% compared to 25% on its trading 
partner in Ghana.
Thin capitalisation: another transfer pricing 
scheme, where the African subsidiary borrows 
from the Mauritius subsidary, deducting its 
interest payments from the inal tax bill, while 
the Mauritius subsidiary’s lending proits 
(derived from those same interest payments) 
are taxed minimally.
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similar law will probably be passed by the EU 
in 2013. Admittedly both laws relate only to 
the extractive industries and are restricted to 
tax payments made on a country-by-country 
reporting basis, but both are steps in the right 
direction. In addition, both laws suggest that the 
time for a broader application of country-by-
country reporting has arrived. 
TJN will continue to campaign for that broader 
version of country-by-country reporting.
5.2 Automatic  
information exchange
Information exchange between countries would 
go a long way towards deterring tax evasion and 
tax avoidance. 
As explained in chapter four, there are two 
forms of information exchange. The irst 
is information exchange on request. This 
occurs when one country requests data from 
another country with whom it has a double 
tax agreement or tax information exchange 
agreement. These are usually bilateral i.e. 
between two countries. Occasionally they are 
multilateral. The USA now has some variations 
on this theme, such as the Foreign Account Tax 
Compliance Account arrangements, but they are 
exceptional.
The alternative to these ‘on request’ agreements 
is automatic information exchange. Under 
such arrangements one country agrees to 
automatically supply data they collect from 
their inancial services sector and others on 
income earned in their jurisdiction that is paid 
or payable to people who are tax resident in the 
other jurisdiction.
The best known example of automatic 
information exchange is the European Savings 
Tax Directive. However, as we noted in chapter 
4, this is restricted in the range of income that it 
addresses and in its geographical coverage. 
TJN wants automatic information exchange to 
become the global standard for international 
cooperation to tackle tax avoidance and 
evasion. The reason for wishing this simple: 
evidence from the USA has shown that when 
a taxpayer knows that a source of income will 
be automatically declared to their tax authority 
they are highly likely to be deterred from trying 
to evade taxes. When the taxpayer knows 
that the income is not automatically disclosed 
to the tax authority the deterrent effect falls 
signiicantly. 
5.3 Ensuring that information 
on the beneicial ownership of 
companies, trusts, foundations 
and charities is available on 
public record
As previously noted, across the world laws are 
being introduced to require inancial services 
providers to know their clients and the true 
identity of the owners of the companies, trusts, 
foundations and charities that they might provide 
services to, manage or account for. The driving 
force behind this change is the anti-money 
laundering agenda of the IMF’s Financial Action 
Task Force. Ideally this enhanced disclosure 
regime would have contributed to tackling tax 
evasion, but three barriers have prevented this 
from happening:
Firstly, even when ownership data exist it 
is dificult for tax authorities to access this 
information under the terms of Double Tax 
Agreements and Tax Information Exchange 
Agreements. That is because under the terms 
of those OECD inspired agreements the tax 
authority making an enquiry of another country 
has to prove they know the beneicial ownership 
of an offshore company or trust before they 
can ask what that beneicial ownership might 
be, making the whole exercise somewhat futile. 
The absurdity of this situation would be almost 
comical were it not true. 
Secondly, the information is also of limited value 
because many secrecy jurisdictions (Switzerland 
being a prime example) do not treat tax evasion 
as a crime for money laundering purposes. The 
obvious solution to this problem is that the 
Financial Action Task Force should now demand 
that all countries make tax evasion a crime 
Any move towards a global framework for tax cooperation should 
involve the extension of the principle of automatic information 
exchange to corporate bodies and trusts as well as to individuals since 
a lot of tax planning involves trusts and corporations.
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for money laundering purposes (technically tax 
evasion should be made a ‘predicate crime’ under 
anti-money laundering legislation). 
Thirdly, the relevant information must be 
obtained and made available on public record. 
The right to use limited liability companies, trusts, 
foundations and charities is a right granted by a 
state. That right has valuable privileges attached 
to it, including (and not exclusively) the right to 
not pay debts in some cases and to secure tax 
advantages in others. In view of these privileges 
it is vital that full information is put on public 
record about all companies and other limited 
liability entities, trusts, foundations and charities in 
all jurisdictions. That information would include:
• the constitution of the organisation;
• its registration number;
• the names and addresses of all real, beneicial 
owners of organisation and if necessary the 
names of their nominees as well;
• if there are no owners, the name and 
address of the founder(s) of the organisation;
• if there was no founder of the organisation 
the name and address of the person who 
issues instructions to the management of 
the organisation (this possibility exists in 
the case of some offshore foundations and 
trusts);
• the names and addresses of those who 
manage the organisation, whatever their 
titles, and if they are nominees then the 
names and addresses of those for whom 
they act must be disclosed. If a company 
manages the organisation then full details 
for its ownership and management structure 
must also be disclosed;
• the names and addresses of those who beneit from trust and foundation structures;
• the annual accounts of the organisation. 
It is only if this information is available that the 
abuse permitted by the use of companies and 
other structures can be curtailed. 
Finally, requiring information disclosure is 
inadequate if resources are not provided to 
enforce compliance with disclosure requirements. 
This might involve charging a small annual fee 
to the companies, trusts and other legal entities 
involved. This is a small contribution to make 
towards enjoying the tangible beneits enjoyed 
by legal entities.
5.4 Citizenship and  
personal taxation
The problems associated with tax haven usage 
are frequently linked to a growing number of 
high net worth individuals (hen-wees) who 
globe trot in pursuit of paying little or no tax. 
These hen-wees are supported by a tax 
avoidance industry of professional people 
(mainly bankers, lawyers and accountants) who 
service their needs through tax havens. It’s 
important to note that the hen-wees concerned 
may, or may not, live in tax havens: their itinerant 
life styles allow them to oficially live nowhere 
for tax purposes. Alternatively, they may base 
themselves in countries like the UK that offer 
them highly preferential tax treatments. It is also 
important to note that the professional people 
working in tax havens are rarely of local origin: 
they are also itinerants playing a game of tax 
abuse. 
Both the hen-wees and those who service their 
offshore wealth, which we estimate at between 
US$21trillion to $32 trillion, can play these 
games because most countries allow them to do 
it. With only few exceptions, notably the USA, 
most countries determine tax residence for 
individuals on the basis of whether a person is 
present in their country for more than 183 days 
a year. This allows hen-wees to become stateless 
with relative ease, enabling them to receive large 
parts of their income subject to little or no tax. 
This gives rise to several problems:
• prominent hen-wees, including rock stars, 
set a poor example by engaging in tax 
avoidance;
• as a consequence the people most able to 
pay tax in the world often pay little or no 
tax;
• it stimulates a parasitical industry of 
lawyers, accountants and bankers who 
enable hen-wees to live as economic free-
riders;
• it undermines democracy and the ability 
of governments to tax their citizens on a 
progressive basis.
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towards enjoying the tangible beneits enjoyed 
life styles allow them to oficially live nowhere 
• 
• 
• 
• 
This situation, which was unacceptable in the 
days when travel was dificult and the number of 
truly mobile people in the world amounted to a 
few thousand, has deteriorated to the point of 
being a global crisis. The collapse of public inances 
in Greece starkly illustrates the consequences 
of allowing tax evasion by wealthy elites to 
become endemic. Greece is a harbinger of what 
will happen in other countries unless effective 
measures are taken to curtail tax avoidance and 
evasion.
Thankfully there is an answer to this problem, and 
it is provided by the USA. The USA applies strict 
rules on residence based on physical presence for 
those who are not citizens of that country but 
who choose to live there. Importantly, its rules 
on determining the tax status of its own citizens 
are different from almost all other jurisdictions 
because anyone holding a US passport is liable to 
US tax, whether or not s/he actually lives in the 
country and has US source income.
This principle provides an effective way of 
tackling tax abuse by hen-wees. If it were applied 
worldwide, the world’s itinerant population of 
globally wealthy people would be caught by the 
tax systems of their home states even if they 
claimed to live in a tax haven. As an added beneit, 
the footloose accountants, lawyers and bankers 
who operate from tax havens would also be 
caught in the tax net of their own home states.
5.5 Corporate taxation
Revelation after revelation in recent years has 
shown that the current approach to taxing 
multinational companies is deeply lawed. The 
situation has deteriorated considerably since 
countries started competing with one another 
in a vain attempt to entice foreign investors by 
offering tax incentives, many of which involve 
turning a blind eye to how proits are shifted to 
tax havens.
A new approach to taxing corporations 
is required. A national basis for corporate 
taxation makes no sense when multinational 
companies might operate in 150 or more states 
simultaneously. It is illogical to treat each company 
within a group as a separate entity when the 
constituent parts of a multinational corporation 
clearly do not function independently from 
one another. Taxing locally when companies act 
globally has given rise to a crisis in taxing capital. 
For the sake of economic justice, that crisis must 
now be addressed.
In reaction to this crisis some think-tanks 
and academics, typically those sponsored by 
multinational business, have suggested that the 
solution to this problem is to simply stop taxing 
companies. The basis for their argument is that 
tax is always eventually paid by people. In theory 
there is merit to this argument: in practice it is 
completely illogical for three reasons.
The irst is that because of the myriad layers 
of secrecy that wealthy individuals use to hide 
their ownership of companies actually inding 
who to tax when the proits of companies are 
distributed as dividends may be impossible, 
meaning that no tax is paid. It may also be 
impossible to decide who owns shares when 
they are, for example, held by pension funds, or 
are traded rapidly on stock exchanges. In the 
real world it is nigh on impossible to attribute 
tax liability to anyone on any reasonable basis. 
Secondly, this logic assumes that tax should be 
paid where the owner of a company is located 
and not where the proit arises. So, for example, 
if a major Brazilian trading company is owned by 
a Cayman resident person this argument would 
suggest that all tax on the proits of the Brazilian 
activity should be paid in Cayman (where the 
tax rate is zero). This completely ignores the 
fact that the company beneits enormously from 
services provided by the Brazilian state. That is 
illogical: a company should make a contribution 
towards the infrastructure, education, health, 
welfare, pensions and other services the state 
provides to its workforce. If it does not it is free-
riding services paid for by others.
Thirdly, this proposal ignores the fact that 
society grants a valuable privilege to companies 
in the form of limited liability that individuals do 
not enjoy. In return for that privilege, which has 
tangible beneits, the company has a duty to pay 
tax. The often cited notion that companies are 
simply collections of individuals simply does not 
hold true: individuals do not enjoy the beneit of 
limited liability. 
Taxing locally when companies act 
globally has given rise to a crisis 
in taxing capital. For the sake of 
economic justice, that crisis must now 
be addressed
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Happily, there is a viable alternative to the 
current approach to tax multinational companies, 
and this alternative, which is already used at 
state level in the USA, ignores the cleverly 
crafted use of tax havens to avoid tax and takes 
account of the genuine economic substance of 
the companies’ activities. This approach, known 
as unitary taxation, works as follows:
• trading proits are allocated to countries 
according to an agreed formula which 
typically takes account of where a company 
employs its staff, where it owns physical 
assets, and where its customers are; 
• interest and other investment income will 
initially have to be taxed on a source basis;
• a residence basis will be required to tax 
investment income and gains. 
The advantages of this approach include:
• corporations would pay tax on all their proits without possibility of double 
taxation;
• proits are allocated to the countries where 
they are earned;
• countries would regain sovereignty over 
the setting of their own tax rates and 
would not suffer from proits shifting to tax 
havens.
Unitary taxation faces intense lobbying by 
multinational companies, their tax advisers (who 
earn very high fees from the current OECD-
led approach), and from other vested interests. 
EU attempts to adopt a form of unitary tax 
are iercely resisted, not least by European tax 
havens like Ireland. It is time for civil society 
to build a counter lobby in support of unitary 
taxation. 
5.6 Country level actions to 
improve personal and corporate 
taxation
In order to enhance equity as well as the 
effectiveness of taxation systems, as a minimum 
countries should:
• have a precise deinition of who is and is 
not resident in its territory; 
• tax its residents on all their world-wide 
income and gains, without exception. This 
means adopting what is called the ‘residence 
basis of taxation’;
• ensure that all income that arises in their 
country is subject to tax before it is paid 
to a person who is not tax resident. So, 
for example, bank interest paid by a bank 
within the country should be subject to 
a withholding tax before being paid to 
a non-resident person. This means that 
the country also uses a ‘source basis of 
taxation’.
• give credit to all their resident people 
and companies for any tax they pay on a 
source of income in another country when 
taxing it on a residence basis in their own 
jurisdiction to avoid double taxation;
• ensure that all groups of companies with 
international income that operate within its 
territory are taxed on a fair part of their 
world-wide income. This means that most 
issues arising from transfer pricing, thin 
capitalisation and licensing abuses cease to 
be a concern;
• commit to international cooperation on 
tax which as a minimum would require 
arrangements for automatic information 
exchange, full cooperation with other tax 
authorities who request assistance with 
tackling tax avoidance and evasion, and 
assistance to another country seeking to 
recover tax due to it. 
5.7 General anti-avoidance 
principle 
Tax avoidance is the process of using loopholes 
to circumvent the spirit of the law with 
the intention of paying less tax than would 
otherwise be due. The loopholes exploited may 
be in a country’s tax law, or between its tax 
and accounting law, or maybe between the laws 
of that state and another state. Whatever the 
cause, abuses happen because it is impossible 
to draft law that can take account of every 
possible circumstance while remaining both 
comprehensible and manageable. 
For a long time tax avoiders have said that if the 
loopholes exist that is not their fault and it is 
the job of government to close them. Around 
the world various ways of trying to do this have 
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been tried but without exception they result 
in greater complexity in tax law and frequently 
open up as many opportunities for abuse as 
they seek to close. The way to cut through 
this Gordian knot is to adopt a general anti-
avoidance principle. 
A number of countries have such principles in 
place, although with varying degrees of success, 
depending largely upon how rigid they are. The 
more rigid they are the more accurately they 
can be described as general anti-avoidance rules. 
Unfortunately, such rules do not work because 
they usually create new loopholes that the tax 
avoidance industry seeks to exploit. 
A general anti-avoidance principle adopts the 
logic that if any transaction is undertaken 
primarily to secure a tax advantage (which 
means a reduced tax payment), or, if any step 
is added into a series of transactions for that 
purpose:
• then the beneit that transaction creates for 
taxation purposes can be ignored, and;
• tax can be charged as if that transaction 
or step had not been included in the 
arrangement that the tax avoider put in 
place. 
An example might help. Suppose a tax avoider 
decides to sell a company and is advised by her 
tax lawyers that shifting its ownership to an 
offshore trust prior to selling would reduce any 
tax liability arising from the sale. The presence 
of a general anti-avoidance principle would allow 
the tax authority to ignore the existence of the 
offshore trust and charge tax as if the trust had 
never been created. 
Such a legal principle should, in our view, be a 
part of the law in every country. It is also an 
essential part of any tax system that seeks to 
ensure that all income is subject to tax. This is 
because whilst any tax system has to be rule-
based to make the detail of its arrangements 
work, rules are not suficient by themselves to 
make the system comprehensive. Principles need 
to be built-in to ensure that the rules do not 
create their own problems. 
This suggestion is unpopular with the tax 
planning industry. As one tax accountant said 
to the press in March 2004: ‘No matter what 
legislation is in place, the accountants and 
lawyers will ind a way around it. Rules are rules, 
but rules are meant to be broken.’ It is harder to 
break principles, which is precisely why they are 
so useful in this context. 
5.8 Codes of Conduct
Codes of conduct covering taxpayers, tax 
professionals and government can enhance tax 
justice. 
Professional institutes for those engaged in 
supplying tax advice and services should issue 
codes of conduct requiring their members to 
desist from tax avoidance activities. We cannot 
how see tax avoidance is consistent with any 
form of professional ethics.
We suggest this should be taken further: 
companies and taxpayers who can provide 
evidence of tax compliance should be able to 
sign up for codes of conduct which reduce their 
risk of tax audit. The punishment for breaking 
the code would, however, be more severe 
penalties than those normally imposed by the 
courts. 
We also propose that governments should 
be bound by codes of conduct to ensure they 
are also held to account for their conduct in 
managing a country’s tax system.
5.9 World Tax Authority
Many of the problems we have outlined above 
arise because of the lack of functional and 
just rules on how to tax capital in an era of 
globalised markets. The existing organisations 
working on international tax policy either lack 
a global mandate, i.e. the OECD, or lack the 
political authority to agree new rules, i.e. the UN 
Tax Committee. 
In the same way that the World Trade 
Organisation sets the rules for international 
trade, a World Tax Authority (WTA) is needed 
to monitor the impacts of iscal policies on trade 
and investment patterns, and to protect national 
tax policies from the harmful practices of tax 
Unitary taxation faces intense lobbying by vested interests. It is time for 
civil society to build a counter lobby in support of unitary taxation. 
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havens. TJN is not alone in seeing this gap in the 
international institutional architecture: in 1999 
former director of iscal affairs at the IMF, Vito 
Tanzi, proposed that the prime function of an 
international tax organisation should be to ‘make 
tax systems consistent with the public interest of 
the whole world rather than the public interest 
of speciic countries’. 
The most appropriate body to take on the 
functions of a WTA would be the United 
Nations, which could and should evolve its 
existing Committee of Experts on International 
Cooperation in Tax Matters to ill this role. Such 
a body could undertake the following tasks:
• Work with international accounting bodies to deine a common basis for determining 
proits;
• Work to establish a common basis for 
determining taxable income;
• Help set rules for allocating the proit 
income of transnational companies;
• Assist international exchange of taxation 
information;
• Help to protect national tax regimes 
from predatory practices such as tax 
competition;
• Establish dispute reconciliation procedures;
• Assist those countries wishing to adopt 
unitary taxation to agree appropriate 
formulas for proit allocation;
• Collate relevant statistics and act as a 
forum for discussion and sharing of best 
practice.
These tasks are essential in the interests of tax 
justice and would reinforce the autonomy of 
sovereign states, which has been radically eroded 
by the existence of tax havens.
A WTA could also carry out the task of 
recommending best practice in creating 
taxation law. The IMF and World Bank already 
disseminate best practice in some areas. Tax law 
should also be an area for application of best 
practice standards. This would make possible 
the establishment of an international benchmark 
for the achievement of tax justice against which 
progress could be monitored.
5.10 Tax assistance for poorer 
countries
Poorer countries rarely have the resources 
to implement appropriate taxation policies. 
This undermines their ability to develop and 
implement just tax policies, and to reduce their 
dependence on external aid and debt. In many 
cases the weaknesses of their tax regimes stem 
from factors such as:
• the available cash resources being used for 
other, more immediate, priorities;
• their senior tax oficials being lured away 
by offers of higher paid employment in the 
private sector;
• local tax oficials feeling unable to challenge 
powerful multinational companies for fear 
they will remove their investment.
For these reasons international assistance should 
be provided to poorer countries to ensure they 
can establish:
• sound taxation systems based on 
appropriate law;
• suitable accounting standards;
• data registries for companies, trusts, 
foundations and charities;
• effective tax administrations;
• rigorous accountability standards for 
multinational companies;
For a long time tax avoiders have said that if the loopholes exist that is not their fault 
and it is the job of government to close them. Attempts to remedy this often result in 
greater complexity in tax law and frequently open up as many opportunities for abuse 
as they seek to close. The way to cut through this Gordian knot is to adopt a general 
anti-avoidance principle. 
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• international enforcement procedures for 
taxing multinational companies;
• dispute reconciliation procedures;
• attractive career paths for senior personnel.
5.11 Holding governments to 
account
It is not suficient to ensure that countries can 
raise the tax revenues they need. It has to be seen 
that this is done, that the process is free from 
corruption, and that the funds raised are used for 
the purpose for which they are intended.
This means governments have to account 
openly and transparently for their actions. There 
are initiatives that seek to do this including, 
perhaps most notably, the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative. This is, however, limited in 
scope to a single industry.
It could also be argued that the OECD’s Global 
Forum on tax information exchange; the IMF’s 
Financial Sector Assessment Programme and 
the Financial Action Task Force’s reviews all, 
to some degree undertake this task. However, 
none of these organisations focus on reviewing 
the overall effectiveness of a tax administration 
and its ability to uphold its domestic law to 
collect tax effectively free from corruption and 
maladministration. 
It is partly for this reason that we promote Codes 
of Conduct for governments, as noted above.
The work of civil society organisations like the 
International Budget Project, which seek to 
hold government to account for their spending 
is crucial, and similar programmes are needed 
on the revenue raising side. Increasingly, local 
chapters of TJN are taking on this role.
5.12 The national agenda
The international tax agenda is important, but 
tax reform has to be national and even local on 
occasion if tax justice is to be ensured. It is not 
the role of this publication to offer suggested 
reform of any individual tax system. Decisions 
regarding such issues will be decided by those 
campaigning for reform at a national level. 
However, the following questions have to be 
raised when considering whether a national or 
local tax system is just:
• does the country have a comprehensive 
system of taxes?
• do tax rates ensure a progressive tax 
charge?
• are there too many loopholes or signiicant 
rate changes that allow income to avoid tax 
in some way?
• are corporate structures or trusts unduly 
favoured by the tax system?
• are sales taxes fair and are essential items 
exempt from tax?
• are the tax and beneit systems 
appropriately linked to avoid the creation of 
a poverty trap?
• are the bases on which tax is charged 
fair and consistent between all citizens, 
residents and types of entity so that 
opportunities for abuse do not arise? 
• is the country undertaking information 
exchange with other countries on a fair 
basis?
• is tax legislation clear, available to all, and 
is there a fair appeals system in the case of 
misunderstandings?
• is the administration of tax fair and free 
from corruption?
• does the country have a general anti-
avoidance provision that allows tax abuse to 
be challenged quickly and effectively?
• are professional irms appropriately 
regulated and held to account for their 
actions?
• are appropriate accounting standards in 
place?
The prime function of an international tax 
organisation should be to ‘make tax systems 
consistent with the public interest of the whole world 
rather than the public interest of speciic countries’. 
Vito Tanzi, former director of iscal affairs, International 
Monetary Fund
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• do all companies (however described in law) and trusts have to ile details of their 
constitutions, management and ownership 
on public record, and do they have to ile 
annual accounts which are audited if their 
income is above agreed thresholds? Is this 
information available for public inspection at 
modest cost?
• does the government offer tax incentives, 
holidays and other arrangements to attract 
inward investment and so favour some 
businesses over others, meaning unfair tax 
competition is created?
• does the country have a secrecy score of 60 
or more on TJN’s Financial Secrecy Index? If 
so, how can it improve on this score?
• does the country measure its tax gap, and 
are adequate measures being taken to reduce 
that gap?
Many of these questions will require detailed 
research but some are easier to campaign on 
than others. For example, in many countries 
there is inadequate disclosure of the ownership, 
management and accounts of companies and 
trusts, so this is a straightforward target for a 
campaign on transparency. 
The work of civil society organisations like the 
International Budget Project, which seek to hold 
government to account for their spending is 
crucial, and similar programmes are needed on 
the revenue raising side.
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Accounts The annual published statements issued by a company in accordance with 
the legislation and regulation of the country in which it is incorporated 
for the beneit of shareholders and others (if they are permitted access 
under local law) who wish to appraise the inancial performance of a 
limited liability company or other limited liability entities such as a limited 
liability partnership.
If the company is registered on a stock exchange that requires 
compliance with the rules of the International Accounting Standards 
Board, then the accounts will also have to comply with their rules. 
Otherwise they will comply with locally issued accounting standards.
Accounts will normally include a statement from the directors of the 
company providing an overview of the trading of the entity for the year, 
a proit and loss account showing its income and expenditure during 
the period and its net proit plus an estimate of taxation liabilities that 
will arise from them, a cash low statement showing how it used the net 
cash surplus or deicit that it generated during the course of the year, 
a balance sheet showing its total assets and liabilities at the year-end as 
represented by the total net investment by the shareholders and notes to 
the accounts which explain each of the statements. 
Accounting 
standards
Regulations governing the way in which certain transactions are reported 
within the accounts of companies and other entities. Originally issued 
on a national basis, and usually by the professional bodies of accountants 
within each country, they are now being supplanted by International 
Financial Reporting Standards issued by the International Accounting 
Standards Board.
Afiliated company A company likely to be more than 20% owned by another company that 
does not however own more than 50% of it. The owning company often 
has signiicant inluence over an afiliate but not absolute control which 
50% usually brings
Aggressive tax 
avoidance
A term used by those who try to argue that some tax avoidance is 
acceptable by seeking to rank schemes so that some are worse than 
others. 
Aggressive tax avoidance is a term applied to the use of complex schemes 
of uncertain legality to exploit taxation loopholes. The term tax avoidance 
is applied by TJN to all schemes that seek to get round the law. 
Arising basis A method for taxing income earned somewhere other than the country 
where the taxpayer is resident for tax purposes. Under the arising basis 
income earned outside the country of residence is liable to tax in the 
year in which that income is earned even if it is not remitted to the 
country where the taxpayer is resident and liable to pay tax. Compare 
with the remittance basis.
6. GLossarY
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Associated 
company
See afiliated company
Banking secrecy Banking secrecy laws strengthen the normal contractual obligation of 
conidentiality between a bank and its customer by creating criminal 
penalties that prohibit banks from revealing the existence of an account 
or disclosing account information without the owner’s consent. These 
laws can be used to block requests for information from foreign tax 
authorities. 
It is important to note that banking secrecy is not just created by law: 
it can also be created by fact. For example some of the UK linked tax 
havens do not have banking secrecy laws but by the time a bank account 
is hidden behind a trust and a company, often with each being in different 
jurisdictions, the same effect is achieved.
Beneicial owner The person who actually has the right to enjoy the income or capital that 
possession of property might provide. The terms is used to contrast with 
the legal or nominee owners of property and with trustees, all of whom 
might be recorded as having legal title to property without possessing 
the right to enjoy the beneits of using it. One of the biggest problems 
in tackling offshore tax abuse is discovering who the beneicial owner 
of assets might be, especially when they are hidden behind discretionary 
trusts. 
Bilateral 
information 
exchange
Exchange of information between the tax authorities of states can be 
done bilaterally or multilaterally. When done bilaterally, two main types of 
agreements are used. The irst are Double Taxation Agreements (DTAs). 
The second are Tax Information Exchange Agreements (TIEAs). Bilateral 
Double Taxation Agreements and Tax Information Exchange Agreements 
are agreed between the two participating states: no other state is party 
to the agreement. In multilateral agreements more than two states are 
parties to the agreement. Bilateral agreements are relatively common; 
multilateral agreements are rare. 
Brass plate 
company
See Shell Corporation.
Capital light The process whereby wealth holders deposit their funds and other assets 
offshore rather than in the banks of their country of residence. The result 
is that assets and the income derived from them are often not declared 
for tax purposes in the country in which a person resides. Capital light 
and tax evasion are intimately linked phenomena.
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Charitable trust A trust established for purposes accepted by law as charitable. This does 
not stop such trusts being abused: their tax-free status is an attraction 
to some. They can also be used to pass assets between generations free 
of inheritance tax whilst keeping them irmly under family control whilst 
income can be paid from such trusts to family members as fees or salaries 
meaning that despite the charitable structure little beneit to charity need 
arise. 
Citizenship basis of 
taxation
This is one way of deciding who within a state is liable to pay tax in that 
place. The citizenship basis of tax ensures tax is paid on the worldwide 
income of all citizens of the state irrespective of whether they are 
physically resident or not in the territory of which they are a citizen 
during the period for which the taxes are levied. The most obvious 
example of a country using the citizenship basis is the USA. 
Company or 
corporation
A legal entity created by law treated as a separate legal person from 
those who set it up. Almost all countries now allow for the creation of 
companies but the rules by which they do so vary considerably. Most 
offer limited liability. That means the members of the company are not 
liable for its debts if it were to go bankrupt. When companies were 
irst made available it was thought this was a privilege requiring that 
accounts and information concerning the ownership and management 
of the company should be put on public record. That principle has been 
undermined by tax havens. As a result the abuse of anonymous companies 
is one of the biggest issues for those tackling tax injustice.
Controlled foreign 
corporation (CFC) 
A CFC is a subsidiary company or corporation of another (parent) 
company. The CFC is registered in a tax haven or other territory where 
little or no tax is charged on the proit the subsidiary makes. This 
clearly opens up opportunities for proits to be shifted from the parent 
company to the offshore subsidiary. To prevent this CFC rules provide 
that proits declared by the subsidiary can in some cases be subject to 
tax in the country of residence of the parent company even though it is 
not resident there. These rules reached their heyday at the turn of the 
millennium. Since then EU court rulings have dramatically undermined 
their effectiveness, leading to a boom in offshore activity. 
Coordination 
centres
A special form of company with taxation advantages, often used to attract 
corporate headquarters to a country. These types of coordination centres 
are most notably found in Belgium, the Netherlands and Ireland and are 
often used by IT and other intellectual property based companies that 
can sell their services at a distance over the web or by companies that 
rely heavily on patent income e.g. pharmaceutical companies. 
Corporation tax A tax on the proits made by limited liability companies and other similar 
entities. It is often similar in application to income tax but can also 
embrace a capital gains tax. Rates charged are often lower than those 
used for income tax purposes, especially on the most well off, giving them 
considerable incentive to transfer their income into companies. 
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Country by country 
reporting
A proposed form of accounting in which a multinational corporation will 
be required to report in its accounts in which countries it operates, what 
the names of its subsidiaries are in each and every jurisdiction in which 
it operates, and to publish a proit and loss account for each jurisdiction 
where it trades, without exception, showing its sales and purchases, 
both from third parties and intra-group, the number of employees it has 
and the cost of employing them, its inancing costs both third party and 
intra-group, its proit before tax, its tax charge split between current and 
deferred tax, and a summary of its assets and liabilities in the location. 
Currency 
transaction tax
A form of inancial transaction tax: it is a tax levied by a country that 
issues a currency on all the trades in that currency worldwide at very low 
rates e.g. 0.005 per cent. See inancial transaction tax for more details
Deferred tax This is maybe the weirdest form of tax in the world for there is actually 
no such thing as a deferred tax. The term is used for an accounting 
entry that is made because the rules of accountancy generally require 
that income be matched with expenses. If an expense is recognised for 
tax purposes more quickly than it is for accounting purposes (which is 
common, for example, in the cases of much plant and equipment) this 
means that the tax cost for the years when this happens are understated. 
Conversely, when all the tax allowances have been used on the assets 
there might still be accounting charges to make and the tax cost would 
then be overstated in the resulting accounts. To balance this equation a 
notional tax charge called deferred tax is charged to the proit and loss 
account in the earlier years and put on the company’s balance sheet as 
a liability. The liability is released as a credit to proit and loss account in 
the later years and supposedly over the life of the asset all should balance 
out. There are many reasons for deferred tax charges: all have the same 
purpose. What is misleading is that International Financial Reporting 
Standards require that deferred tax be provided even when there is 
only a remote chance that it might be paid. This has led to massively 
overstated and misleading tax charges in company accounts with regard 
to tax that is likely to never be paid. 
Director Shareholders own limited companies but they do not run them. That 
job is given to its directors. All limited companies must have at least 
one director. The directors of limited companies may be other limited 
companies in many jurisdictions. Directors are responsible for the 
management of the affairs of a company and its compliance with all laws 
that apply to it. Directors are usually appointed by the members of the 
company at General Meetings of the membership. In many offshore 
arrangements directors are ‘nominees’ who sell their names to the 
company so that they can be considered directors. Despite holding that 
ofice these ‘nominees’ actually have little or no knowledge of what the 
company actually does, its real affairs being managed by other people who 
are technically called ‘shadow’ directors, but whose identity is often hard 
to discover. 
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Discretionary trusts Most offshore trusts permit payments to be made to almost anyone 
at the discretion of the trustees, which means that the identity of the 
beneiciaries of those trusts can remain a secret. In practice, trustees 
normally follow a ‘letter of wishes’, provided by the settlor, instructing 
them who they are to pay money to, when and how. There is, therefore, 
much less discretion about who actually beneits from those trusts then 
their trust deeds would suggest is the case.
Domicile The country identiied as a person’s natural home, even if that person 
has not been resident there for extensive periods of time. The concept 
is important in determining who pays tax in some countries, and 
most especially in the UK where a “non-domiciled” person need not 
necessarily pay tax on their worldwide income when domiciled people 
must. This explains why the UK is so attractive to wealthy people for 
whom it is a highly effective tax haven. 
Double tax relief Tax relief given by the country in which a taxpayer resides for tax paid 
in another country on a source of income arising in that other country 
to ensure that no more tax is paid on that income than is demanded to 
be paid by the country with the higher of the two rates that might be 
applied to it. 
Double tax treaty An agreement between two sovereign states or territories to ensure, 
as far as possible, that income arising in one and received in the other is 
taxed only once. Includes rules to deine Residence and Source, and limits 
on Withholding Taxes. Also usually includes provisions for cooperation to 
prevent avoidance, especially information exchange. Many are now being 
rewritten as attitudes on information exchange develop.
Effective tax rate The percentage of tax actually paid in relation to the total income of the 
person paying the tax. This can either be calculated for one tax, or for all 
taxes payable. It is used as a basis for comparison within a state, to see if a 
system is progressive or regressive, and for international comparison. 
TAX JUSTICE NETWORK48
EU Code of  
Conduct on 
Business Taxation
The EU’s Code of Conduct for business taxation was established by its 
Council of Economics and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) in December 
1997. The Code is not a legally binding instrument though it has political 
force. By adopting this Code, Member States undertake to roll back 
existing tax measures that constitute harmful tax competition and refrain 
from introducing any such measures in the future (‘standstill’).
The Code was speciically designed to detect only measures that unduly 
affect the location of business activity in the Community by being 
targeted merely at non-residents and by providing them with a more 
favourable tax treatment than that which is generally available in the 
Member State concerned. The criteria for identifying potentially harmful 
measures include:
an effective level of taxation which is signiicantly lower than the general 
level of taxation in the country concerned;
• tax beneits reserved for non-residents;
• tax incentives for activities which are isolated from the domestic 
economy and therefore have no impact on the national tax base;
• granting of tax advantages even in the absence of any real economic 
activity;
• the basis of proit determination for companies in a multinational 
group departs from internationally accepted rules, in particular those 
approved by the OECD;
• lack of transparency.
The Code has had considerable impact both within member states, but 
most especially on the tax havens affected associated with the UK or the 
Netherlands. This has been most clearly seen in the tax reforms imposed 
on the Crown Dependencies of Jersey, Guernsey and the Isle of Man.
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European Union 
Savings Tax 
Directive
The EU Savings Tax Directive was adopted to ensure the proper 
operation of the internal market and tackle the problem of tax evasion. It 
was approved in 2003 and came into effect on July 1st, 2005. 
It is an agreement between the Member States of the European Union 
(EU) that requires Member States to exchange information with each 
other about EU residents who earn interest on savings and investments in 
one EU Member State but live in another. Although the legal scope of the 
Directive does not extend outside the EU, certain jurisdictions – such as 
Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Andorra, Monaco, and San Marino, ]equivalents 
– have agreed to put in place legislation that supports the aims of the 
Directive. 
All Member States are ultimately expected to automatically exchange 
information on interest payments by paying agents established in their 
territories to individuals resident in other Member States. While the 
vast majority of EU member states have applied automatic information 
exchange as their effective system for cooperation, Austria and 
Luxembourg remain committed to a system of information reporting 
at the end of an indeinite transitional period, during which they levy 
a withholding tax at a rate of 15% for the irst three years, 20% for 
the following three years, and 35% thereafter. They transfer 75% of the 
revenue of this withholding tax to the investor’s state of residence. 
Both Austria and Luxembourg are entitled to receive information from 
the other Member States. The investor in those places has an option 
to provide for preliminary information of his or her Member State of 
residence for tax purposes about the savings held abroad, or to permit 
the disclosure of the income to the same State, as an alternative to the 
retention or withholding tax.
The Directive has a relatively broad scope that covers interest from debt-
claims of every kind whether obtained directly or as a result of indirect 
investment via most collective investment undertakings and other similar 
entities.
The European Commission on 13 November 2008 adopted an amending 
proposal to the Savings Taxation Directive, with a view to closing 
existing loopholes and better preventing tax evasion. Progress on this 
is currently being blocked by Austria and Luxembourg, both of whom 
refuse to participate in automatic information exchange and prefer a tax 
withholding option instead. 
The major weaknesses in the Directive are that it only applies to interest 
income and only to income paid to individuals and not to companies, 
trusts, foundations and other arrangements. The proposed amendments 
would address many of these issues. 
Export processing 
zones
Artiicial enclaves within states where the usual rules relating to taxation 
and regulation are suspended to create what are, in effect, tax havens 
within larger countries. The rules that are relaxed may be for import and 
export taxes or corporation taxes or all three and may also extend to 
relaxing other regulations e.g. on health and safety or the environment. 
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Financial 
Transaction Tax 
See Tobin Tax
Flags of 
convenience
The lag of a country with easy or lax maritime regulations and low fees 
and taxes, lown by ships registered in such countries, even though they 
have no substantial connection with the country. Liberia was once the 
best known but many tax havens now offer such services. They are also 
commonly associated with regulatory abuse e.g. with regard to seafarers 
pay and work conditions. 
Flat tax A tax system in which as income rises the amount of tax paid remains 
constant in proportion to total income. Compare with progressive taxes. 
The term is usually only applied to income taxes. 
General anti-
avoidance principle
A legal principle that seeks to prevent a taxpayer from obtaining the 
taxation beneit arising from any transaction if they undertook it solely 
or mainly to obtain a tax beneit. It does so by looking at the motivation 
of the taxpayer at the time of entering into the transaction, which is 
usually determined by the likelihood of any tax advantageous step in a 
transaction having a commercial explanation. If a commercial motive for 
each step in a transaction can be offered then it is likely that the person 
undertaking it will secure the tax beneit inherent in the transaction. If no 
such motive can be found. Compare with a general anti-avoidance rule. 
General anti-
avoidance rule
A general anti-avoidance rule seeks to tackle those who try to break the 
rules of taxation through the use of further rules. Rather than considering 
intention, it lays down speciic limits on the ways of interpreting series of 
events to determine whether the beneit of tax legislation can be given to 
the taxpayer. Rules are invariably open to interpretation, hence a general 
anti-avoidance rule runs the risk of increasing the opportunity for abuse. 
Gift tax Taxes charged on gifts either during life or on death. The charges may be 
on the donor or on the cumulative value of gifts received by the recipient. 
GST Goods and services tax or sometimes a general sales tax. See sales tax.
Hedging In theory hedging is a form of insurance involving a variety of complex 
inancial instruments including call options, put options, short selling or 
futures contracts. Genuine hedging can reduce market risk, for example 
on the price of a crop to be sold at a future date. In reality much hedging 
involves socially useless speculative activity, often of a very short-term 
nature, Its complexity hides the risks latent within it whilst the fact that a 
lot of hedging is recorded offshore (even though managed from onshore) 
suggests that a signiicant proportion of hedging activity is conducted to 
shift real proits made onshore into offshore locations. 
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High net-worth 
individuals
Otherwise known as HNWIs (pronounced hen-wees). Generally 
categorised as individuals with more than US$1 million of inancial 
assets (i.e. worth excluding the value of their main home) available for 
investment.
Holding companies A company that either owns all or more than 50 per cent of another 
company, which is then called its subsidiary company. An intermediate 
holding company is a holding company that has one or more subsidiaries 
but is itself owned by another company. The term ‘ultimate holding 
company’ refers to the company at the top of the pile which is inally not 
controlled by another company. Some holding companies have thousands 
of subsidiary companies. 
Illicit inancial lows Illicit money is money that is illegally earned, transferred or utilised. 
Breaking laws at any point during their transmission earns such funds this 
label. Frequently described as “dirty money”. These transfers come in 
three forms: (1) the proceeds of bribery and theft; (2) criminal activities 
including drug trading, human traficking, illegal arms, contraband and 
more; and (3) commercial trade mis-pricing and tax evasion. The latter is 
by far the largest, and is believed to comprise two thirds of the total. 
Income tax A tax charged upon the income of individuals. It can also be extended to 
companies, though this is uncommon. The tax is usually charged on both 
earned income, whether from employment or self-employment, and on 
unearned income e.g. savings income from investments and property. 
Inheritance tax A tax charged upon the gifts people make out of their wealth, most 
commonly (but not always) at the time of their death. . 
International 
Business 
Corporations (IBC)
A type of company once offered by many offshore inance centres and tax 
havens that receives all or most of its income from abroad. IBCs usually 
pay an annual registration fee but are subject to minimal or zero tax rates. 
Now less common than a decade ago as a result of pressure brought 
to bear on the jurisdictions offering them as a result of the EU Code of 
Conduct on Business Taxation. 
International 
Finance Centre
See Offshore Finance Centre
Inversion The act of a parent company whose headquarters are located within one 
jurisdiction switching registration with an offshore subsidiary they own 
to secure location within that offshore jurisdiction in order to secure 
a tax advantage. At one time mainly occurring in the USA, it became a 
UK phenomenon as well from 2009 onwards and has also been used by 
corporations such as Glencore, which is technically registered in Jersey as 
a result. 
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Land value taxation A tax on the rental value of a site, assessed as if it were undeveloped and 
unimproved – in other words, as if it were bare land. 
Licence. (Licensing) A contract for the use of property, often intellectual property such as a 
patent, copyright or trademark. If ownership of the intellectual property 
is placed in a company located in a tax haven the licence fee income 
paid to that tax haven company may be exempt from tax whilst the fee 
paid to it may be subject to tax relief in the country from which it is 
paid, giving a signiicant tax beneit. This type of tax exploitation is now 
commonplace in the IT, pharmaceutical and similar sectors where patents 
are commonplace. 
Limited company See private company and quoted company.
Limited liability 
partnerships (LLP)
A partnership that provides its non-corporate members with limited 
liability. LLPs are frequently based offshore for tax avoidance purposes. 
Loophole A technicality that allows a person or business to avoid the scope of a law 
without directly violating that law. Loopholes are crucial to tax avoidance 
since they are the mechanism by which people ‘get round the law’ – 
which is what tax avoidance really involves. 
Money-laundering The process of ‘cleaning’ money from criminal or illicit activities to give it 
the appearance of originating from a legitimate source.
National insurance 
contributions 
See social security contributions. 
Nominee See directors and shareholders. Nominees are people who undertake 
such roles for a fee but who act strictly in accordance with the 
instructions of others who really undertake the duties attached to these 
functions. As such they are ‘front people’ who pretend to fulil a role 
without actually doing so. 
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Offshore Offshore does not, contrary, to popular perception, have any physical 
geographic meaning. It is speciically not a term for small tax haven islands. 
Offshore refers to the practice of recording a transaction in one 
location that actually takes place somewhere else. So, for example, using 
a Luxembourg company to record sales made in the USA is an offshore 
activity. A German person banking in London to pay someone in France is 
also undertaking offshore activity, in London. 
The important point is that the activity recorded in an offshore location 
is always taking place in another location.
Offshore inancial 
centre
Although most tax havens like to call themselves Offshore Finance 
Centres (OFCs) the terms are not synonymous. 
Tax havens offer low or minimal rates of tax to non-residents. This 
does not however mean that they also host a range of inancial services 
providers. 
An OFC offers low tax rates and hosts a functional inancial services 
centre, usually including branches or subsidiaries of major international 
banks as well as the ofices of accountants and lawyers to service offshore 
clients. 
States and microstates that host tax havens and OFCs dislike both terms, 
preferring to call themselves International Finance Centres.
Offshore world Those places that without appearing to act in unison coordinate to 
provide a range of services that can be integrated over one or more 
locations to ensure that the offshore activities of a person cannot be 
traced or can only be traced with the utmost dificulty. 
Parent company A company that controls another company (which is then called its 
subsidiary company) either by owning more than 50% of the second 
company or by controlling the composition of its board of directors. A 
parent company may have thousands of subsidiary companies, some of 
which will themselves be parent companies, in which case they are called 
intermediate parents. In that case the company not subject to control at 
the top of the hierarchy is called the ultimate parent company. 
Partnerships Any arrangement where two or more people agree to work together 
and share the resulting proits or losses. A partnership can be between 
individuals, companies or a mixture of both. 
Payroll taxes See social security contributions. 
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Permanent 
Establishment
An ofice, factory, or branch of a company in a country where it is 
otherwise non-resident. Under Double tax treaties business proits 
are taxable at source if attributable to a Permanent Establishment. 
Rules regarding permanent establishments can be dependent upon 
arrangements concluded in double tax treaties. 
Poll tax A tax that levies the same sum on each person irrespective of their 
means to make payment of the sum owing. Poll taxes are profoundly 
regressive and unjust. 
Preferential tax 
treatment
A situation in which individuals or companies can negotiate their own 
tax treatment in the state in which they have a tax liability. Pioneered 
by Switzerland in the 1920s, the arrangement is commonplace in the 
offshore world. 
Private company A company whose shares are not traded on a stock exchange. In a 
private company shares cannot usually be sold without the consent 
of the company or other shareholders; in many countries little or no 
information need be disclosed on the activities of such companies even 
though their members enjoy the beneit of limited liability.
Proit laundering The process of transferring proits from a territory in which they would 
be taxed to another in which there is either no tax or a lower tax 
rate. Mechanisms for achieving this include transfer-pricing, re-invoicing, 
licensing, thin capitalisation, corporate restructurings, hedging, reinsurance 
and inversions. 
Progressive taxes A tax system in which as a person’s income rises the amount of tax paid 
increases in proportion to the income as well as in absolute amount i.e. 
the percentage tax rate increases as the income rises. Also referred to as 
Graduation. Compare with lat and regressive taxes. 
Public company A company whose shares are traded on a recognised stock exchange 
and are available to be bought and sold by anyone who wishes without 
consent being required from the company itself. Generally required to be 
more transparent than private companies. 
Quoted company See public company. 
Race to the bottom The downwards trend of tax rates and regulatory requirements on capital 
arising from competition between sovereign states to attract and retain 
investment.
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Redomiciliation An increasingly common process where a company moves its country of 
incorporation from one country to another while maintaining the same 
legal identity. The problem with the ease with which this can be done is 
that a company that redomiciles often can stay almost constantly one 
step ahead of authorities who might be chasing it. 
Registered ofice The oficial address at which a company may be contacted. Unfortunately 
this is very often the address of a lawyer or accountant and as a result no 
clue as to the real whereabouts of the company is provided in such cases, 
which assist creation of a veil of secrecy over their activities. 
Regressive taxes A tax system in which as a person’s income from all sources increases 
the amount of tax they pay reduces in proportion to their income even if 
it increases in absolute amount i.e. their percentage tax rate falls as their 
income goes up. Compare with progressive taxes and lat taxes.
Reinsurance Some large companies decide not to insure their risks with the 
conventional insurance markets but instead set up their own insurance 
companies. When insurance companies do this it is called reinsurance. 
By setting up a captive or reinsurance company offshore, a tax deduction 
for the premiums paid is available in the country where the risk is and 
the premium is received offshore where there is little or no tax. This can, 
therefore, be viewed as another form of tax avoidance. 
Re-invoicing Re-invoicing involves invoicing a sale to an agent, typically based in a 
tax haven or OFC, who subsequently sells on to the inal purchaser. In 
practice the agent pays part of their mark up to the original vendor or 
to the purchaser, usually to an offshore account. This is a widely used 
process for laundering proits to a tax haven. The process is dependent 
upon secrecy for its success. It is now commonly denied that such 
practices occur but it is only secrecy that prevents such claims from being 
tested. 
Remittance basis The remittance basis is one of the ways in which income earned outside 
the country in which a person resides can be brought within the scope of 
tax in that place. The remittance basis says that tax is only due in the year 
when income is remitted to the country in which the taxpayer is resident: 
it is not taxable when it actually arises. The remittance basis enables a 
person to avoid tax indeinitely in their country of residence provided 
their overseas income is kept and / or spent abroad. Compare with the 
arising basis. Both have relevance within the context of the residence 
basis of taxation. 
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Remittance basis, 
companies
The remittance basis for companies is a compromise between the 
residence basis for companies and the territorial basis for companies. 
All the income of the subsidiaries of the parent company subject to the 
remittance basis can be taxed in the jurisdiction in which it is resident 
under the remittance basis but only when it is paid by way of dividend 
back to the parent corporation. The result is that there is a very strong 
incentive to keep funds subsidiaries outside the parent company 
jurisdiction and to reinvest them overseas rather than remit them, where 
they would be taxed. This is having a massive impact on US multinational 
company behaviour where this system is in operation. 
Residence For an individual, a person’s tax residence is their settled or usual home; 
for simplicity a presumption may be applied based on a rule-of-thumb, 
such as presence within the country for six months or 183 days in any 
tax year. It may be possible to be resident in more than one country 
at one time (though double tax treaties aim to prevent this). Some 
individuals may also try to avoid being resident anywhere. For companies, 
residence is usually based on the place of incorporation but can also be 
where the central management and control of the company is located, if 
they are different. Tax haven companies formed for non-resident owners 
are usually deined not to be resident in their country of incorporation. 
If they use secrecy to deny their presence in another state where they 
really trade they can achieve non-residence through stealth. This is, of 
course, tax evasion, and is a major cause of the tax loss attributable to tax 
havens / secrecy jurisdictions.
Residence basis 
(individuals)
Under the residence basis of taxation residents of a territory pay tax in 
that place on all their worldwide income wherever it arises, usually with a 
credit being given for tax already paid overseas. The aim is to discourage 
residents from investing abroad in lower tax countries, by ensuring that 
income is taxed at the resident country rate if it is higher. Compare with 
source and unitary basis.
Residence basis 
(companies)
The residence basis for companies is in some ways more complex 
than for individuals as companies can be made up of many individual 
subsidiaries all reporting to a parent company. The term ‘residence basis’ 
will usually be applied in this situation to the tax regime that applies to 
the parent company. If it is taxed on a residence basis then the jurisdiction 
in which it is based will seek to charge the income it earns to tax, either 
through taxing dividends received from those subsidiaries when they 
are remitted to that jurisdiction or through the operation of controlled 
foreign company rules. In combination with transfer pricing arrangements 
these provided a triumvirate of controls to make sure all group income 
was likely to be eventually be taxed in the parent company jurisdiction, 
with credit having been given for foreign tax already paid. Compare with 
remittance basis and territorial basis for companies. 
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Ring-fencing Ring fencing describes situations in which different and preferential 
tax and regulatory treatments are given by tax havens to companies 
and trusts owned by non-residents compared to the treatment given 
to companies and trusts owned by their own residents. In most cases 
the latter will be prevented from taking advantage of the arrangements 
available to non-residents. 
Robin Hood tax See Tobin tax
Sales tax Taxes on sales can be levied in two ways. Firstly, as a general sales tax 
added to the value of all sales with no allowance for claiming a rebate on 
tax paid. Secondly, as a value added tax (VAT) (sometimes called a goods 
and services tax – GST) charged by businesses on sales and services 
but which allows businesses to claim credit from the government for 
any tax they are charged by their suppliers. The burden of VAT therefore 
falls almost entirely on the ultimate consumers. GST and VAT are both 
regressive taxes since lower income households always spend a higher 
proportion of their income on consumption and therefore invariably 
spend a greater proportion of their income on this tax than do better off 
households. VAT is by far the most widely used form of sales tax.
Secrecy jurisdiction Secrecy jurisdictions are places that intentionally create regulation for 
the primary beneit and use of people and legal entities not resident in 
their geographical domain. That regulation is designed to undermine the 
legislation or regulation of another jurisdiction. To facilitate its use secrecy 
jurisdictions also create a deliberate, legally backed veil of secrecy that 
ensures that the people from outside the jurisdiction making use of its 
regulation cannot be identiied.
Secrecy providers The accountants, lawyers and bankers working from offshore who sell 
secrecy.
Secrecy world Sometimes called the ‘offshore world’ but better described as the secrecy 
world. 
Shareholders The owner of the shares in a company. In many secrecy jurisdiction 
companies the registered shareholders are nominees so the real-life 
beneicial ownership of the company cannot be identiied. 
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Shell corporation A limited liability entity usually formed in a tax haven / secrecy 
jurisdiction (including the UK and USA) for the purposes of hiding 
illicit inancial lows, tax evasion or regulatory abuse. The entity is highly 
unlikely to have a real trade, its sole purpose being to hide transactions 
from view. No one knows how many such corporations there are, but 
they are commonplace. Other names are sometimes used e.g. ‘brass 
plate companies’, indicating a legal entity whose only real presence is 
the plaque on the wall of a lawyer’s ofice recording the location of its 
registered ofice. 
Social security 
contributions
Payments made towards a fund maintained by a government usually 
used to pay pension and unemployment beneits. Health beneits are 
sometimes covered as well. Social security contributions are generally 
considered to be taxes. They are covered by the more generic name 
payroll taxes since they are often collected alongside income taxes from 
the payments made to employees but they can also be charged on the 
self-employed as well. 
Source basis This relates to the taxation of income in the territory where it is earned. 
Under most double tax treaty rules, income attributable to a Permanent 
Establishment is taxable at source. Some countries tax only on a source 
basis, and consider income earned outside the country exempt; but some 
tax on the basis of both source and residence (subject to a foreign tax 
credit) to ensure a more comprehensive approach and to tackle obvious 
opportunities for tax avoidance arising from shifting a source of income 
out of a country if a residence basis is . Compare with residence and 
unitary bases. 
Special purpose 
vehicles
Any company, trust, LLP, partnership or other legal entity set up to 
achieve a particular purpose in the course of completing a transaction, 
or series of transactions, typically with the principal or sole intent of 
obtaining a tax advantage. 
Stamp duty A tax on the value of contracts. Usually charged on contractual dealings 
on shares and other stocks and securities and on dealings in land and 
property.
Subsidiary company A company 50% or more owned or controlled via its board of directors 
by another company which is then called its parent company. 
Tax arbitrage The process by which a sophisticated taxpayer plays off two systems 
of regulation to obtain a tax beneit as a result. Most commonly tax 
arbitrage is between the tax laws of different jurisdictions but it can 
also relate to exploiting different accounting regulations to achieve 
tax beneicial effects or to trading one tax off against another within a 
jurisdiction e.g. income tax against corporation tax. 
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Tax avoidance The term given to the practice of seeking to minimise a tax bill without 
deliberate deception (which would be tax evasion or fraud). The practice 
may be summarised as ‘seeking to get round the law’.
Tax avoidance usually entails setting up artiicial transactions or entities 
to re-characterise the nature, recipient or timing of payments. Where the 
entity is located or the transaction routed through another country, it is 
international avoidance. Special, complex schemes are often created purely 
for this purpose. Since avoidance often entails concealment of information 
and it is hard to prove intention or deliberate deception, the dividing 
line between avoidance and evasion is often unclear, and depends on the 
standards of responsibility of the professionals and specialist tax advisers. 
An avoidance scheme which is found to be invalid entails repayment of 
the taxes due plus penalties for lateness.
Some claim that this term refers to any activity that reduces the amount 
of a person’s income subject to tax, for example, claiming of allowances 
and reliefs clearly provided for in national tax law. This is not a position 
with which TJN agrees. If the law provides that no tax is due on a 
transaction then no tax can have been avoided by undertaking it. This 
practice is now generally described as tax compliant. TJN instead uses 
the term tax avoidance to refer to the practice of seeking to not pay 
tax contrary to the spirit of the law. Some also call this aggressive tax 
avoidance, although this is not a term we consider useful. 
This term is one of the most contentious in the tax lexicon. 
Tax base The range of transactions that a country chooses to tax. A broad base 
includes a wide range of transactions. A narrow base includes relatively 
few transactions. 
Tax competition Tax competition is the pressure brought to bear on governments to 
reduce taxes, usually to attract investment, either by way of reduction 
in declared tax rates or through the granting of special allowances and 
reliefs such as tax holidays or the use of export processing zones. 
In practice tax competition largely beneits mobile activities or businesses, 
but the competition to attract investment may result in an overall 
decline of corporation tax rates and in the amounts of corporation tax 
paid, often resulting in a switch of the tax from the owners of capital to 
workers and consumers.
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Tax compliance A term that means making payment of tax due without engaging in tax 
avoidance or evasion. It is used in contrast to the terms tax avoidance and 
tax evasion. 
Tax compliance in this context is used as a test of a person’s intention 
before they undertake a transaction. It asks whether the person is seeking 
to comply with the spirit of the legislation concerning the transaction 
into which they are entering. If they are, then it should be presumed their 
intent was to be legal. 
If, on the other hand, they are seeking to comply with the letter but not 
the spirit of the law (and it is usually possible to determine this from the 
form the transaction takes) then it should be presumed their intent was 
to get round that law, the onus of proof otherwise falling upon them. 
This test can be used in connection with a general anti-avoidance principle 
to determine whether that principle should be applied to a transaction, or 
not. A person who has used an appropriate motive is ‘tax compliant’.
The term can also refer to the process of complying with the 
administrative requirements of tax law e.g. completing a tax return. 
Tax eficiency A term used by tax professionals to suggest getting away with paying as 
little tax as possible. It is a euphemism for tax avoidance. 
Tax evasion The illegal non-payment or under-payment of taxes, usually by making a 
false declaration or no declaration to tax authorities; it entails criminal or 
civil legal penalties.
Tax gap The difference between the tax a government would collect if all tax due 
in accordance with its law was paid and the amount that it is actually paid. 
The tax gap has three components: tax avoidance, tax evasion and tax 
paid late. 
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Tax haven A tax haven is any country or territory that promotes laws with the 
intent that they may be used to avoid or evade taxes which may be due 
in another country under that other country’s laws. The low tax rates 
offered by tax havens are key to their business model, but unless they also 
promote laws that assist a person to take advantage of them the low tax 
rate in itself may not be of much attraction. Secrecy is the key product 
that assists the use of low tax rates, hence the now more precisely 
deined term secrecy jurisdiction that is replacing the term tax haven in 
technical use. 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development deines 
tax havens as jurisdictions where: 
1. Non-residents undertaking activities pay little or no tax;
2. There is no effective exchange of taxation information with other 
countries;
3. A lack of transparency is legally guaranteed to the organisations based 
there;
4. There is no requirement that local corporations owned by non-
residents carry out any substantial domestic (local) activity. Indeed, 
such corporations may be prohibited from doing business in the 
jurisdiction in which they are incorporated. 
Not all of these criteria need to apply for a territory to be a haven, but a 
majority must.
Tax holidays A period during which a company investing in a country does not have to 
pay tax under an agreement with its government. 
Tax information 
exchange 
agreement
TIEAs are bilateral agreements under which territories agree to co-
operate in tax matters through exchange of information. In practice the 
model was little used until the G20 applied considerable pressure to tax 
havens / secrecy jurisdictions to sign such agreements. There have been 
hundreds signed since 2009 as a result but the evidence is that they are 
little-used because of the considerable obstacles to making requests that 
are inherent within the agreements themselves. 
Tax mitigation A phrase used by tax professionals when describing the desire to pay as 
little tax as possible. Another euphemism for tax avoidance. 
Tax planning A term used in two ways. It can be used as another term for tax 
mitigation. In this case it is another euphemism for tax avoidance. 
When, however, tax legislation allows more than one possible treatment 
of a proposed transaction the term might legitimately be used for 
comparing various means of complying with taxation law. If that is the 
motive then tax planning is consistent with tax compliance. 
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Tax shelter An arrangement designed to protect part or all of a person’s income 
from taxation. The offer of such an arrangement may result from a 
government desire to encourage some types of behaviour or activity, 
but as commonly it may be a commercial or legal ruse, often artiicial in 
nature, used to assist tax avoidance activity.
Territorial basis A basis for taxation that only charges the income of the residents of a 
territory to tax if it comes from a source also located in that territory. 
The obvious weakness in this basis for tax, which is uncommon for 
individuals but increasingly common for companies, is that it encourages 
the artiicial relocation of a source of income out of a territory and to a 
tax haven. 
Thin capitalisation Thin capitalisation describes the process of inancing a company with 
a high proportion of loans rather than shares. Used by transnational 
corporations to reduce the business proits of a subsidiary in a relatively 
highly taxed location, since the interest on loans is usually allowed as 
a deduction against proit, so reducing tax paid, whereas dividends on 
shares are paid out of after-tax income. The interest is usually paid to 
another subsidiary of the transnational corporation located in a tax haven 
where no tax is paid upon its receipt, resulting in an overall reduction in 
the tax charge of the group of companies. 
Tobin tax A Tobin Tax (also called Currency Transaction Tax, Financial Transaction 
tax and Robin Hood Tax) is a tax on trading on the foreign exchange 
markets named after the late James Tobin, the Nobel Prize winning 
economist, who proposed the idea as a means of reducing high frequency 
low margin trading on currencies. It may also be applied trades in other 
inancial products such as shares, bonds, gilts, derivatives and hedges. The 
case for adopting a inancial transaction tax is gaining political support in 
Europe. 
Transfer-pricing A transfer pricing arrangement occurs whenever two or more businesses 
(whether corporations or not) which are owned or controlled directly 
or indirectly by the same people trade with each other. The term transfer 
pricing is used because if the entities are owned in common they might 
not ix prices at a market rate but might instead ix them at a rate which 
achieves another purpose, such as tax avoidance. If a transfer price can 
be shown to be the same as the market price then it is acceptable for tax 
purposes. What are not acceptable for tax purposes are transfer prices 
that increase the cost or reduce the sales value in states which charge 
higher tax rates and increase the sales value or reduce the costs in states 
with lower tax rates. 
The dificulty for many corporations at a time when over 50% of world 
trade is within rather than between corporations is that there is no 
market price for many of the goods or services they trade between their 
own subsidiaries. This situation arises because they are never sold to third 
parties. This gives rise to complex models in which attempts are made to 
allocate value to various stages within the supply chain within a company, 
which process is wide open to potential abuse. For this reason it is 
argued that such irms should be taxed on a unitary basis.
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Transnational 
corporations 
(TNCs) 
A corporation with subsidiaries or divisions in two or more nations. Also 
known as multinational corporation (MNC).
Trusts A trust is formed whenever a person (the trust settlor) gives legal 
ownership of an asset (the trust property) to another person (the 
trustee) on condition that they apply the income and gains arising from 
that asset for the beneit of a third person (the beneiciary). Trusts can 
be established verbally but typically take written form. Trustees are 
frequently professional people or irms charging fees. Trusts are usually of 
one of three types:
• discretionary trust
• charitable trust
• interest in possession trust.
Trustee A person who holds the legal title to assets held in a trust and who 
administers it. The irst trustees of a trust will be appointed by the settlor. 
The trustees may be paid for their work but are not usually allowed to be 
beneiciaries of the trust they administer. In secrecy jurisdictions trustees 
are often hired nominees who sign papers sent to them by the real 
controllers of the trusts they administer. In many cases that is the settlor. 
Trust beneiciary Anyone who may obtain a beneit from a trust. A person who has a 
right to receive a beneit from the trust has an ‘interest in possession’. If 
someone can receive a beneit but has no legal right to do so they are 
called a discretionary beneiciary. They only get a beneit if and when the 
trustees decide to pay it to them. 
Trust settlor The person who establishes a trust by gifting assets to it. Having made the 
gift they are usually supposed to have no further inluence over a trust 
but in many tax havens that is not the case and the settlor very often 
remains in complete control of the assets of the trust despite their having 
supposedly gifted them for the beneit of others. 
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Unitary basis Unitary taxation treats the income of a group of companies as being one 
combined sum subject to tax that is then apportioned to a country for 
tax to be assessed by applying a formula to determine where it might 
best be considered to have been earned (hence the term ‘formulary 
apportionment’ is widely applied to this process). Each state may then 
apply the rate of tax to it that it wishes. Unitary taxation is an alternative 
to the residence and source bases of taxation. 
Unitary taxation has been used in federal countries such as the USA 
where an allocation formula based on a ratio of sales, employment costs 
and assets employed within each state is used. It has been opposed by 
tax authorities (and MNCs) because they consider that it would be too 
dificult to reach international agreement, most especially on the formula. 
However, taxation of highly integrated MNCs may in practice entail a 
formula-based allocation of proits, albeit through negotiation of the sums 
allocated to each state under the arm’s length method of transfer pricing 
for which there is frequently no realistic basis for determination because 
of the absence of alternative market based evidence of third party pricing.
Value Added Tax  Known as VAT. See sales tax
Washington 
Consensus 
The term ‘Washington Consensus’ was created in 1989 by John 
Williamson. It originally described the economic policy prescriptions 
used by Washington DC-based institutions such as the International 
Monetary Fund and World Bank, but subsequently evolved to denote the 
vigorous application of free-market theory.
Wealth tax A tax on a person’s declared wealth, typically imposed annually at a very 
low rate. Once commonplace in Europe these are currently rarely used 
since they are thought to encourage people to hide assets offshore. 
However, there is renewed interest in their use and how they might play a 
role in reducing inequality and in tackling the worldwide inancial crisis. 
Withholding tax Tax deducted from a payment made to a person outside the country 
from which the payment is made. Generally applied to investment income, 
such as interest, dividends, rents, royalties and licence fees.

‘tax havens cause poverty’
The Association for Accountancy & Business Affairs
The role played by secrecy jurisdictions in encouraging and proiteering 
from tax avoidance, tax evasion and capital light from developed and 
developing countries is a scandal of gigantic proportions.
A large fraction of global inancial wealth – by TJN’s estimate at least 
US$21 trillion as at 2010 – has been invested virtually tax-free through 
the world’s expanding black hole of offshore secrecy jurisdictions. This 
offshore economy is large enough to dramatically impact on oficial 
estimates of inequality of wealth and income; on estimates of national 
income and debt ratios; and, crucially, on the public inances of countries 
across the world.
At the same time, free-riding multinational businesses make use of 
international tax avoidance opportunities to increase their proits and 
gain a harmful advantage over local competitors. These irms also use 
their power to force governments to lower tax rates and provide 
tax incentives to attract investment. This has resulted in a shift of the 
tax burden to workers and lower-income households and has forced 
damaging cutbacks in public services.
Tax us if you can is required reading for all who want to understand 
the role of tax havens/secrecy jurisdictions in the global economy and 
the workings of the tax avoidance industry that is secretly embedded 
within it. In an accessible yet rigorous approach, this book offers a guide 
to the language of international tax policy and shows how lawyers, 
accounting irms and banks proit from abusive tax practices. It also 
outlines the numerous policy failures that have encouraged the creation 
of the shadow economy of secrecy jurisdictions and proposes a range of 
practical solutions to this cancer in the global economy.
